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AN ACCOMMODATION OF THE YOUNGER
DOCTRINE AND THE DUTY OF THE
FEDERAL COURTS TO ENFORCE
CONSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARDS IN
THE STATE CRIMINAL PROCESS
DONALD H. ZEIGLERt
I. INTRODUCTION
A coalition of civil-liberties and public-interest-law groups
recently addressed a letter of protest to the distinguished jurists
and lawyers attending a national conference on law reform.1
The letter decried recent decisions of the Supreme Court that
drastically limited access to the federal courts and accused the
Court of "embark[ing] on a dangerous and destructive journey
designed to dilute the power of the federal judiciary to serve as
guardian of federal constitutional rights. '2 The letter contended
further that "[i]f the trend ... is not reversed ... constitutional
rights and liberties will be imperiled, and the people will be
unable to defend themselves against arbitrary and unconstitu-
tional actions of state officials .... 1,,
The authors of the letter were reacting in large part to the
t Attorney-in-Charge, Special Litigation Unit, The Legal Aid Society of the City of
New York. A.B. 1966, Amherst College; J.D. 1969, Columbia University.
I The Conference was entitled "The National Conference on the Causes of Popular
Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice," in commemoration of Harvard Law
School Dean Roscoe Pound's speech of the same title given in 1906. N.Y. Times, Apr.
7, 1976, at 11, col. 3.
2 Letter from Aryeh Neier, et al., to participants in the "Pound Revisited" Confer-
ence, Apr. 7, 1976, at 2, on file with the American Civil Liberties Union, 22 E. 40th St.,
N.Y., N.Y. 10016 [hereinafter cited as Letter].
'Id. The Chief Justice defended the Court's record at a news conference the fol-
lowing day. Chief Justice Burger cited increased federal caseloads and the development
of prisoners' rights law in rebuttal to the charges. N.Y. Times, Apr. 9, 1976, at 51,
col. 8. Public criticism of decisions limiting access to the federal courts, however, has
continued. N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1976, § 1, at 31, col. 1; Editorial, The Court and
Freedom, N.Y. Times, May 31, 1976, at 14, col. 1; Oelsner, The Diminishing Right to Fight
City Hall in Court, N.Y. Times, Apr. 11, 1976, § 4 (The Week in Review), at 9, col. 1.
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ever-widening application of the nonintervention doctrine ar-
ticulated in Younger v. Harris.4 In Younger and its companion
cases, 5 the Supreme Court held that principles of federalism,
comity, and equity forbid a federal court from enjoining or ef-
fectively halting a state criminal prosecution, except when the
moving party has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer
great and immediate irreparable injury if denied relief.6 This
doctrine has been interpreted recently by some federal courts to
ban federal injunctive or declaratory relief against unconstitu-
tional state criminal practices and procedures that are either
ancillary or completely unrelated to the criminal proceedings
themselves. 7 Moreover, the Supreme Court has suggested that
certain alternate remedies, which are only arguably sufficient in
theory and probably futile in practice, constitute adequate rem-
edies at law. 8 Thus, even though the Younger doctrine as prop-
erly understood reflects the sound policy of avoiding unneces-
sary federal interference with state proceedings, some courts
have extended the doctrine to situations in which the potential
interference is minimal and federal court action is essential to
the vindication of the complainants' constitutional rights.
Wallace v. Kern (III),9 which forbade federal intervention to
correct constitutional deficiencies in state bail practices, illus-
trates dramatically the use of the Younger doctrine to curtail the
role of the federal courts in enforcing constitutional rights in the
state criminal process. In Wallace v. Kern (III), the district court
found that bail determinations in the Brooklyn courts were
made perfunctorily, subject to frequent delays, and often based
4 401 U.S. 37 (1971); see Letter, supra note 2, at 2-3. For other discussions of the
Younger doctrine, see Comment, Federal Equitable Relief in Matters Collateral to State Crimi-
nal Proceedings, 44 FORDHAm L. REv. 597 (1975); Comment, Federal Intervention in State
Proceedings: Inadequate Remedies in Adequate Forums, 63 GEO. L.J. 1143 (1975).
- Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971);
Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971); Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971); Byrne v.
Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971).
6 The Court also held that "the cost, anxiety, and inconvenience of having to de-
fend against a single criminal prosecution [does not constitute irreparable injury] in the
special legal sense of that term," 401 U.S. at 46, and that the opportunity to raise
federal claims in the pending state proceeding, with the possibility of ultimate review by
the Supreme Court, constitutes an adequate remedy at law. Id. at 49. Bad faith on the
part of state officials was held to be a special circumstance warranting federal interven-
tion. Id.
See text accompanying notes 124-27 infra.
' See, e.g., Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 350 n.18 (1975).
9 520 F.2d 400 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1109 (1976).
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on incomplete or inaccurate information. The reasons a particu-
lar bail was set were rarely disclosed to the accused or to the
supreme court judge who would review the bail determination.
Furthermore, this appellate review tended to be cursory. 10 The
district court held that such practices denied accused persons
due process of law, and it granted injunctive relief.1
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed on
the ground that the lower court order ran afoul of the Younger
doctrine. The district court had concluded that injunctive relief
in the case before it was not precluded by Younger, because the
relief was not directed at the state proceedings themselves but
at the pretrial detention, the legality of which is not at issue in
criminal trials. 12 Nonetheless, the Second Circuit held that "[t]he
proposition that the principles underlying Younger are applicable
only where the federal court is seeking to enjoin a pending state
criminal prosecution is not supportable,"' 13 and found that the
relief ordered by the district court was impermissible because it
"would indirectly accomplish the kind of interference that
Younger v. Harris... and related cases sought to prevent."'1 4 The
court went on to hold that the plaintiffs could not rely upon the
exceptions to the Younger rule because bail review within the
state system by way of habeas corpus constituted an adequate
remedy at law.'
5
If the Younger doctrine continues to be applied as freely as it
was in Wallace v. Kern (III), federal relief in civil rights actions
that are brought to modify constitutionally defective state crimi-
nal practices and procedures will be effectively foreclosed. Such
a result would involve a tragic abdication by the federal courts of
their responsibility to protect individuals from unconstitutional
state action.' 6 In the discussion that follows, a middle course is
1Id. at 402-03.
Specifically, the court ordered that an evidentiary bail hearing be held upon de-
mand, with five days notice to the district attorney, at any time after 72 hours from the
original arraignment or whenever new evidence justified reassessment of pretrial re-
lease conditions. If the prosecutor recommended imposition of money bail, he would be
required to present evidence demonstrating that nonfinancial release conditions would
not assure the presence of the accused at trial. Id. at 403 n.7.
12 Id. at 405 & n.9.
13 Id. at 405 (footnotes omitted).
14 Id. at 406 (quoting O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 500 (1974)). O'Shea is dis-
cussed in text accompanying notes 96-100 infra.
15 520 F.2d at 406-08.
16 The Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), was designed "to afford a
federal right in federal courts because, by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, intoler-
ance or otherwise" a state might fail to take steps that are necessary to vindicate rights
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suggested 17 that would allow the federal courts to play a substan-
tial role in vindicating the constitutional rights of criminal de-
fendants while limiting the courts' role to avoid the overly broad
interference with state proceedings that the Younger doctrine
seeks to prevent.18 Initially, the historical development of the
Younger doctrine will be examined in order to help define the
proper scope of that doctrine.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE NONINTERVENTION
DOCTRINE OF YOUNGER V. HARRIS-
A STUDY IN JUDICIAL FLEXIBILITY
The nonintervention doctrine, a judicially developed policy
of self-restraint' 9 combining long-established and distinct princi-
guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961).
The Act was specifically directed at situations "where the state remedy, though ade-
quate in theory, was not available in practice." Id. at 174. Therefore, the state remedy
need not be sought and refused before federal relief is sought. Id. at 183. The "legisla-
tive history makes evident that Congress clearly conceived that it was altering the rela-
tionship between the States and the Nation with respect to the protection of federally
created rights .... " Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972). Thus, the Supreme
Court has emphasized that since the Act of 1871, the federal courts have become "the
primary and powerful reliances for vindicating every right given by the Constitution, the
laws, and treaties of the United States." Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 247 (1967)
(emphasis supplied by the Court) (quoting F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS
OF THE SUPREME COURT 65 (1927)); see Wechsler, Federal Courts, State Criminal Law and
the First Amendment, 49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 740, 744-45, 848-57, 877-81 (1974).17 See text accompanying notes 81-83 infra.
18 See text accompanying notes 96-105 infra.
" This doctrine is often confused with its statutory counterpart, the Anti-
Injunction Act of 1793, which provided that a "writ of injunction [shall not] be granted
[by any federal court] to stay proceedings in any court of a state .... " Act of Mar. 2,
1793, ch. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. 334, as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970). As Professor Burton
Wechsler has noted, "Act and doctrine have influenced each other but are distinct and
independent, and if Congress were to repeal the Act tomorrow the judicial doctrine
would not necessarily be eradicated." Wechsler, supra note 16, at 749. See also Hobbs v.
Thompson, 448 F.2d 456, 463 (5th Cir. 1971). As amended in 1948, the Act provides
three exceptions to the original prohibition against all federal intervention. Such inter-
vention is permitted when injunctive relief is (1) "expressly authorized by Act of Con-
gress," (2) "necessary in aid of [the court's] jurisdiction," or (3) needed "to protect or
effectuate [the court's] judgments." 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970), amending Act of Mar. 2,
1793, ch. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. 334. In Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242-43 (1972), the
Supreme Court held that the Act does not apply to actions brought under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1970) because such actions fall within the first exception noted above. Near-
ly all federal lawsuits challenging state criminal practices and procedures arc brought
pursuant to § 1983, and thus the Anti-Injunction Act is relevant to the present dis-
cussion only insofar as it influenced the development of its judicial counterpart. On
the Act generally, see P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND
WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1245-54 (2d ed. 1973)
[hereinafter cited as HART & WECHSLER]; Note, Federal Power to Enjoin State Court
Proceedings, 74 HARV. L. REV. 726 (1961); Note, Federal Court Stays of State Court Proceed-
ings: A Re-Examination of Original Congressional Intent, 38 U. CHI. L. Rav. 612 (1971).
19761
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pies of comity, 2 ° equity,2 1 and federalism, 22 requires that the
federal courts refrain from enjoining a pending state criminal
proceeding unless the complainant has no adequate remedy at
law and will suffer irreparable injury if denied relief. The Su-
preme Court has taken a flexible approach to this doctrine
throughout its history. During periods of judicial activism, the
doctrine has been read narrowly and sometimes ignored, only to
be reasserted during periods of judicial restraint.
The Supreme Court first addressed the issue of the propri-
ety of the federal courts' intervening in state criminal proceed-
ings in In re Sawyer. 23 There the Court relied primarily on the
20 In the context of the relationship between the federal and state courts, comity
refers to the federal courts' respect for "the principle that state courts have the solemn
responsibility, equally with the federal courts, 'to guard, enforce, and protect every
right granted or secured by the Constitution .... .' Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S.
452, 460-61 (1974) (quoting Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S. 624, 637 (1884)). Since the early
days of the English common law, considerations of comity have dictated that a court
should not intervene to divest a court in another judicial system of a cause if the other
court previously acquired jurisdiction. McCormack, Federalism and Section 1983: Limita-
tions on Judicial Enforcement of Constitutional Protections, 60 VA. L. REv. 1, 45 (1974);
Warren, Federal and State Court Interference, 43 HARV. L. REV. 345, 349 (1930).
21 Equity concerns those general principles that, irrespective of federalism and com-
ity, militate against the granting of injunctive relief. Limitations on the equitable powers
of courts originated from the disputes in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries be-
tween the Court of Chancery and the courts of common law in England. See generally I
W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 459-65 (7th ed. 1956); F. MAITLAND,
EQUITY, ALSO THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW 3-10 (1909); H. POTrER,
HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LAW 159-60 (4th ed. 1958). Eventually, it was
established that a court of equity could act only when the moving party was without an
adequate remedy at law and would suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief.
These prerequisites to the exercise of a court's equitable powers have survived to the
present day. Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 814-15 (1974); Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971); Holiday Inns of America, Inc. v. B & B Corp., 409 F.2d 614, 618
(3d Cir. 1969).
Ancient equitable principles also prevented the courts of equity from interfering
with criminal proceedings. See Whitten, Federal Declaratory and Injunctive Interference with
State Court Proceedings: The Supreme Court and the Limits of Judicial Discretion, 53 N.C.L.
REv. 591, 597-600 (1975). This principle was abrogated in America at the turn of the
century. See text accompanying notes 25-33 infra.
12 Federalism is a broad concept requiring... "the National Government . . . to
vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests . . . in ways that will not
unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States." Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37, 44 (1971). As Chief Justice Stone explained in Douglas v. City of Jeannette,
319 U.S. 157 (1943):
Congress, by its legislation, has adopted the policy, with certain well defined
statutory exceptions, of leaving generally to the state courts the trial of criminal
cases arising under state laws, subject to review by this Court of any federal
questions involved. Hence, courts of equity in the exercise of their discretion-
ary powers should conform to this policy by refusing to interfere with or em-
barrass ... proceedings in state courts save in ... exceptional cases.
Id. at 163.
22 124 U.S. at 200 (1888). The Supreme Court failed to consider this issue earlier
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principle of judicial comity and proscribed without exception
federal intervention in a pending state prosecution instituted
prior to the federal action. This strict policy of nonintervention,
however, quickly became incompatible with the Court's per-
ceived need for a more active judicial role in reviewing state
economic legislation. Thus, in the early 1900's, the Court ac-
knowledged the authority of the federal courts to enjoin the
prospective enforcement of state criminal statutes that violated
constitutionally guaranteed property rights.24 During the period
of large-scale economic expansion at the turn of the century,
many states enacted laws regulating interstate commerce. Large
corporations turned often to the federal courts for injunctions
that would restrain state officials from enforcing the criminal
sanctions contained in such legislation.25 One focal point of the
struggle between the corporations and the state governments
concerned attempts by the states to fix maximum railroad rates.
In a series of cases beginning with Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul
Railway v. Minnesota 2 6 and culminating in the landmark decision
of Ex Parte Young, 27 the Supreme Court held that the rate stat-
utes in question deprived the railroads and their stockholders of
property without due process of law,28 and enjoined the pro-
probably because of the belief that the federal courts were without jurisdiction in such
cases. A defendant in a criminal action was usually a citizen of the same state as the
prosecutorial authority, and thus diversity jurisdiction rarely existed. More importantly,
during most of America's first century, Congress relied on the state courts to vindicate
federal rights, Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 245 (1967), and it was not until 1875
that the lower federal courts were granted "original cognizance, concurrent with the
courts of the several states, of all suits ... arising under the Constitution or laws of the
United States .... " Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470. Because most
requests for federal intervention in state criminal proceedings are based on alleged
violations of federal statutory or constitutional rights, such requests probably would not
have been considered cognizable in the lower federal courts prior to 1875. See generally
Chadbourn & Levin, Original Jurisdiction of Federal Questions, 90 U. PA. L. REv. 639
(1942); Forrester, The Nature of a "Federal Question," 16 TUL. L. REV. 362 (1942);
Wechsler, supra note 16, at 744-45.
24 The Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970), discussed at note 19 supra, by
its terms applies only to stays of pending proceedings. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S.
479, 484 n.2 (1965). Thus, injunctions against threatened prosecutions are not barred
by the Act.
2
'See generally CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 770-77 (1973); Developments in the Law-Injunctions, 78
HARV. L. REv. 994, 1024 (1965).
26 134 U.S. 418 (1890).
27 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Other important cases in this series include: Prout v. Starr,
188 U.S. 537 (1903); Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898); Reagan v. Farmers' Loan &
Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362 (1894).
28 The development of the substantive economic due process doctrine in the rail-
way rate cases is traced in E. CORWIN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 83-87
(1964). For a review of subsequent rate regulation cases, see FPC v. Hope Natural Gas
1976]
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 125:266
spective enforcement of the laws.29 The states argued in these
cases that actions against state officials were barred by the
eleventh amendment, which prohibits any federal "suit .
commenced . . . against one of the United States by Citizens of
another State,"3 and that the federal courts lacked jurisdiction
to enjoin threatened state criminal proceedings. The Court re-
jected both of these contentions.31
In Ex parte Young, the Court made short shrift of the state's
argument that contesting the statute's constitutionality as a de-
fense in a state criminal proceeding constituted an adequate
remedy at law, the availability of which barred equitable relief.
The Court noted wryly that "there would not be a crowd of
agents offering to disobey the law,"32 given the possible fine and
imprisonment facing railroad employees who charged more
than the authorized maximum rates. Furthermore,
[t]o await proceedings against the company in a state
court grounded upon a disobedience of the act, and
then, if necessary, obtain a review in this court by writ
of error to the highest state court, would place the
company in peril of large loss ... if it should be finally
determined that the act was valid. This risk the com-
pany ought not to be required to take.
33
Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944), especially the separate opinions of Justices Black and Frank-
furter. See also Cook, History of Rate-Determination Under Due Process Clauses, 11 U. CHI.
L. REV. 297 (1944); Jourolomon, The Life and Death of Smyth v. Ames, 18 TENN. L. REV.
347, 663, 756 (1944). On the rise of the substantive economic due process doctrine, see
generally G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 548-76 (9th ed.
1975) [hereinafter cited as GUNTHER].
29 The lower federal courts were also active in enjoining county attorneys and at-
torneys general from initiating criminal prosecutions under allegedly invalid state liquor
and railroad rate laws during this period. See Warren, supra note 20, at 373 & n.137.
30 U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
31 209 U.S. at 149, 159-62. The decision in Ex parte Young has been called "indis-
pensable to the establishment of constitutional government and the rule of law." C.
WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 48, at 186 (2d ed. 1970). As
Justice Brennan pointed out in Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971) (concurring in
part & dissenting in part);
Ex parte Young was the culmination of efforts by this Court to harmonize the
principles of the Eleventh Amendment with the effective supremacy of rights
and powers secured elsewhere in the Constitution .... These two statutes [The
Civil Rights Act of 1871 and the Judiciary Act of 1875], together, after 1908,
with the decision in Ex parte Young, established the modern framework for
federal protection of constitutional rights from state interference.
Id. at 106-07.
32 209 U.S. at 164.
33 Id. at 165. See generally Note, Federal Relief Against Threatened State Prosecutions:
The Implications of Younger, Lake Carriers and Roe, 48 N.Y.U.L. REV. 965, 975-79
(1973); text accompanying notes 157-72 infra.
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In the years following Ex parte Young, the Supreme Court
continued to examine the constitutionality of state regulatory
statutes containing criminal sanctions, and to enjoin enforcement
of those it found unconstitutional. 34 In 1926, however, the Court
in Fenner v. Boykin 35 announced what was heralded later as a
major modification of the relatively permissive standards that
previously had governed federal intervention in such cases:
Ex parte Young... and following [decisions] have estab-
lished the doctrine that when absolutely necessary for
the protection of constitutional rights courts of the
United States have power to enjoin state officers from
instituting criminal actions. But this may not be done
except under extraordinary circumstances where the
danger of irreparable loss is both great and immediate.
Ordinarily, there should be no interference with such
officers .... The accused should first set up and rely
upon his defense in the state courts .... An intolerable
condition would arise if, whenever about to be charged
with violating a state law, one were permitted freely to
contest its validity by an original proceeding in some
federal court.
36
This statement indeed represents an important change in the
then-prevailing doctrine. First, the Court limited federal inter-
vention in state criminal proceedings to those instances in which
such action was "absolutely necessary for the protection of con-
stitutional rights." Ex parte Young had held without this restric-
tion that state officials who threaten "proceedings, either of a
civil or criminal nature, to enforce ... an unconstitutional act...
may be enjoined by a Federal court of equity from such
action. '37 Furthermore, decisions before Fenner had not required
" For example, in Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915), and Western Union Tel. Co.
v. Andrews, 216 U.S. 165 (1910), the Court held that the enforcement of unconstitu-
tional statutes could be enjoined. In Hall v. Geiger Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917), and
Lindsley v. National Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911), state statutes were found
not unconstitutional after consideration of the merits. In Hygrade Provision Co. v.
Sherman, 266 U.S. 497 (1925), Packard v. Banton, 264 U.S. 140 (1924), and Terrace v.
Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923), the Court stated that it would intervene to protect
property rights and enjoin the enforcement of unconstitutional statutes, but found the
statutes before it constitutional. For an encyclopedic compendium of such cases, see
Wechsler, supra note 16, at 779-85, 779 n.154, 784 n.169. See also B. WRIGHT, THE
GROWTH OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 154 (1942).
35 271 U.S. 240 (1926).
6
1 Id. at 243-44.
1 209 U.S. at 156.
1976]
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a complainant to demonstrate, as a prerequisite to federal action,
the danger of "both great and immediate ... irreparable loss" if
relief were denied. Finally, Ex parte Young and subsequent cases
had held that the opportunity to test the constitutionality of a
state law by way of defense in a state criminal proceeding did not
constitute an adequate remedy at law.3 8 The Fenner decision,
however, required a person threatened with prosecution to "set
up and rely upon his defense in the state courts.
39
Fenner v. Boykin was largely ignored during the next decade,
and the Supreme Court continued to apply pre-Fenner standards
in reviewing the constitutionality of state regulatory statutes con-
taining criminal sanctions. 40 Fenner, however, proved to have
more staying power than many other cases of the era. With the
coming of the Great Depression, the rigorous substantive
economic due process analysis that had reigned since the 1890's
fell into disfavor, 4' and the federal judiciary became increasingly
" See text accompanying notes 32-33 supra. In Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197
(1923), decided only three years before Fenner, the Court had reaffirmed this stance,
noting that to be considered adequate, a potential legal remedy must be as "complete,
practical and efficient as that which equity could afford." Id. at 214.39 Fenner might be distinguished from some earlier cases on the ground that the
plaintiffs in Fenner already had violated the statute at issue, and thus could challenge
the statute's constitutionality in defense of a state criminal proceeding without being
forced to violate it further.
40 The Court upheld some of these statutes, see, e.g., A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton,
292 U.S. 40 (1934); State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527 (1931); Carley
& Hamilton, Inc. v. Snook, 281 U.S. 66 (1930); Gulf Fisheries Co. v. Maclnerney, 276
U.S. 124 (1928); Interstate Busses Corp. v. Holyoke St. Ry., 273 U.S. 45 (1927), and
invalidated others, see, e.g., Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935); Cudahy
Packing Co. v. Hinkle, 278 U.S. 460 (1929); Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235
(1929); Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445 (1927); Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273
U.S. 418 (1927). During this period, the Court rarely discussed its power to intervene in
threatened criminal proceedings. When the issue was mentioned, the Court usually
enunciated pre-Fenner standards. See, e.g., Williams v. Standard Oil Co., supra at 239;
Tyson & Brother v. Banton, supra at 428.
" The doctrine's fall from favor was quite abrupt. First, in Nebbia v. New York,
291 U.S. 502 (1934), the Court held that a New York law regulating maximum and
minimum permissible retail milk rates was not violative of due process. Subsequently, in
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), the Court upheld the constitu-
tionality of a Washington State minimum wage law for women, and overruled Adkins v.
Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923), in which the Court had held a similar District of
Columbia provision invalid under the due process clause of the fifth amendment. In
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), the Court rejected a con-
stitutional challenge to a federal law that prohibited the shipment of "filled milk" in
interstate commerce, and in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), the Court
rejected a similar challenge to a statute that fixed maximum hours and minimum wages
for employees engaged in the production of goods for interstate commerce. See also
Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941). By 1943, Justice Jackson was able to remark
that "the laissez-faire conception or principle of non-interference has withered at least
as to economic affairs." West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 640
(1943). On the decline of the doctrine of substantive economic due process, see gener-
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reluctant to scrutinize state regulatory legislation. Many of the
statutes challenged during this period contained criminal sanc-
tions, and the Supreme Court often avoided ruling on the merits
by citing Fenner42 and strictly applying the nonintervention
doctrine.43
ally Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REv. 1 (1950); Stern, The Commerce
Clause and the National Economy, 1933-46, 59 HARV. L. REV. 645 (1946).
42 For example, in Spielman Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89 (1935), the
petitioner asked the Court to invalidate a New York law regulating the sale of au-
tomobiles. Relying heavily on Fenner, the Court held that the complaint failed to state a
case within the equitable jurisdiction of the district court:
The general rule is that equity will not interfere to prevent the enforce-
ment of a criminal statute even though unconstitutional .... To justify such
interference there must be exceptional circumstances and a clear showing that
an injunction is necessary in order to afford adequate protection of constitu-
tional rights .... We have said that it must appear that the "danger of irrepar-
able loss is both great and immediate"; otherwise, the accused should first set
up his defense in the state court, even though the validity of a statute is chal-
lenged....
[The] complaint failed to meet this test .... [It] contained general allega-
tions of irreparable damage and deprivation of ... due process ... [b]ut...
failed to state facts sufficient to warrant such conclusions .... [T]he case pre-
sented ... was the ordinary one of a criminal prosecution which would afford
appropriate opportunity for assertion of appellant's rights.
Id. at 95-96 (citations omitted). A few years later, challenges to both a Nebraska statute
that regulated railroad crew size and a Florida statute that outlawed combinations in
restraint of trade in copyrighted musical compositions met the same fate in Beal v.
Missouri Pac. R.R., 312 U.S. 45 (1941), and Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387 (1941). Thus,
"[f]or all practical purposes .. . federal courts [were foreclosed] from hearing cases
contesting state economic regulatory statutes containing criminal sanctions." Wechsler,
supra note 16, at 805.
41 The nonintervention, or abstention, doctrine discussed in this Article should not
be confused with the abstention doctrine enunciated in Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman
Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). The Pullman and Younger types of abstention often are
blurred together in the case law. See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965);
Blouin v. Dembitz, 489 F.2d 488 (2d Cir. 1973); Zwickler v. Koota, 261 F. Supp. 985
(E.D.N.Y. 1966) (three-judge court), rev'd, 389 U.S. 241 (1967). According to Pullman, a
federal district judge should postpone hearing a constitutional question in those cases in
which (1) the court is faced with both an issue of federal constitutiorial law and an issue
of state law; (2) decision of the state law issue may obviate the need for decision of the
constitutional question; and (3) the proper resolution of the state issue under state law
is unclear. 312 U.S. at 498-500. The federal court should, however, retain jurisdiction
of the case while the parties obtain a resolution of the state law question in state court.
Id. at 501-02; see England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411
(1964).
Pullman abstention differs from the Younger doctrine in a number of ways. Under
Pullman, a federal court may decline to exercise jurisdiction only in limited circum-
stances, while under Younger, a federal court may exercise jurisdiction only in special
circumstances. Furthermore, Pullman abstention involves merely the postponement of a
federal court's consideration of a constitutional issue. Younger abstention, on the other
hand, requires dismissal of the action.
Pullman abstention has fallen from favor in recent years- See, e.g., Zwickler v.
Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 375-80 (1964). See generally
HART & WECHSLER, supra note 19, at 985-1009; Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases:
The Scope of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1071 (1974); Note,
Federal-Question Abstention: Justice Frankfurter's Doctrine in an Activist Era, 80 HARV. L.
1976] 275
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 125:266
At the same time that the Supreme Court was limiting fed-
eral intervention in the economic field, it was expanding the
federal courts' role in protecting individual liberties from state
encroachment, particularly in first amendment cases.44 This ef-
fort often involved the Court's reviewing the constitutionality of
state statutes containing criminal sanctions and, when appro-
priate, enjoining their enforcement. 45 This policy of judicial ac-
tivism in the individual liberties area resulted in a restricted ap-
plication of the nonintervention doctrine. Frequently, the Court
did not even mention the propriety of federal equitable inter-
vention in the state criminal process.4 6 In Douglas v. City of
Jeannette,47 however, the Court (citing Fenner48) refused to enjoin
prospective prosecutions under a statute that provided criminal
REV. 604 (1967); Comment, The Abstention Doctrine: Some Recent Developments, 46 TUL. L.
REV. 762 (1972).
44 Commentators often point to Chief Justice Stone's famous footnote in United
States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938), as heralding increased
judicial solicitude for Bill of Rights freedoms during this period. See, e.g., GUNTHER,
supra note 28, at 1051-56; McKay, The Preference for Freedom, 34 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1182,
1183 (1959).
45 For example, in Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936), the Court
invalidated a Louisiana statute imposing a two percent gross receipts tax on newspa-
pers, with fine and imprisonment for nonpayment. Likewise, in Hague v. CIO, 307
U.S. 496 (1939), the Court overturned two New Jersey criminal statutes that outlawed
public assembly without a permit from the Director of Public Safety, who was given
absolute discretion to deny permit requests.
46 See, e.g., Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Grosjean v. American Press Co.,
297 U.S. 233 (1936).
47 319 U.S. 157 (1943).
48 The Douglas Court also cited Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387 (1941), discussed in
note 42 supra; Beal v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 312 U.S. 45 (1941), discussed in note 42 supra;
and Spielman Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89 (1935), discussed in note 42 supra,
as supporting its denial of relief.
Although Douglas is treated often as a landmark case restricting federal interven-
tion in state prosecutions brought pursuant to statutes allegedly violative of the Bill of
Rights, see, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45-47 (1971); HART & WECHSLER, supra
note 19, at 1009, its impact should be assessed in light of the Supreme Court decisions
in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943), and West Virginia State Bd. of Educ.
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). In Murdock, which was decided the same day as
Douglas, the Court reversed the convictions of the complainants in Douglas on first
amendment grounds. The Court in Douglas based its refusal to intervene in part on the
assumption that prospective injunctive relief was unnecessary after the decision in
Murdock: "And in view of the decision rendered today in Murdock .... we find no
ground for supposing that the intervention of a federal court, in order to secure
petitioners' constitutional rights, will be either necessary or appropriate." 319 U.S. at
165.
Within six weeks of the decisions in Douglas and Murdock, the Supreme Court re-
versed its earlier decision in Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940),
and enjoined the West Virginia Board of Education from enforcing compulsory flag-
salute regulations against Jehovah's Witnesses, despite the fact that children of that
faith had been expelled from school and their parents prosecuted (for causing delin-
quency) under ancillary criminal statutes. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
supra at 629-30.
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penalties for selling religious literature door-to-door without
paying a license tax.
49
Having examined in the 1930's and early 1940's the propri-
ety of federal court intervention in state criminal proceedings,
the Court rarely mentioned the issue again until its 1965
decision in Dombrowski v. Pfister.5" The nonintervention doctrine
was ignored in the interim probably because strict application of
the doctrine would have seriously hindered the Court's efforts to
end de jure segregation in the South. When the Court held in
Brown v. Board of Education51 that separate schools were "inher-
ently unequal," it failed to mention that one of the suits consoli-
dated in the case challenged provisions of a South Carolina law
declaring it a crime to enroll black and white children in the
same school.52 Subsequently, the Court affirmed lower court de-
cisions enjoining the operation of other state criminal laws de-
signed to enforce segregation in public schools53 and on public
carriers.
54
49 The Court distinguished Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939), discussed in note 45
supra, on the ground that "local officials forcibly broke up meetings of the complainants
and in many instances forcibly deported them from the state without trial." 319 U.S. at
164. In Douglas, on the other hand, "[ilt [did] not appear from the record that petition-
ers [had] been threatened with any injury other than that incidental to every criminal
proceeding brought lawfully and in good faith." Id. I
" 380 U.S. 479 (1965). One notable exception was Steffanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S.
117 (1951), in which the Supreme Court, relying on Douglas, refused to order the sup-
pression of evidence in a pending state prosecution. The decision was significant be-
cause the Court modified by implication its former flat prohibition against intervention
in pending state criminal proceedings. See id. at 122-23; note 72 infra.
51 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
5 21 Id. at 486 n. 1. The South Carolina constitution mandated that schools be racially
segregated, S.C. CONST. art. 11, § 7 (1942), and the South Carolina Code, S.C. CODE
ANN. § 21-751 (1962), made it unlawful to enroll children of one race in schools pro-
vided for persons of another race.
53 In 1961, Louisiana enacted two amendments to its criminal code punishing the
acts of inducing or influencing parents to send their children to a school operated "in
violation of any law of this State." Nos. 3, 5 [1961] La. Acts 2d Extraordinary Sess. 89,
92 (codified at LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:119.1, 14:122.1 (1974)). In a suit brought to
enjoin enforcement of these provisions, the district court rejected summarily the state
attorney general's suggestion that the constitutional issue should be raised first in de-
fense of state criminal prosecutions:
True, "it is a familiar rule that courts of equity do not ordinarily restrain crim-
inal prosecutions." Douglas v. City of Jeannette .... And this principle has
special force when application is made to a federal court to enjoin the en-
forcement of state criminal statutes, for then considerations of comity add their
weight to suggest abstention. Beal v. Missouri Pacfc R. Co .... But the rule
cannot be applied mechanically .... Special circumstances will sometimes com-
pel a federal court to act .... This is such a case.
Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 194 F. Supp. 182, 185 (E.D. La. 1961) (three-judge
court) (citations & footnote omitted), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Gremillion v. United
States, 368 U.S. 11 (1961). The district court held the statutes unconstitutional and
enjoined their enforcement, and the Supreme Court affirmed.
54 In Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala. 1956) (three-judge court)
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When the Supreme Court in Dombrowski v. Pfister55 con-
sidered the propriety of federal court intervention in state crim-
inal proceedings, it appeared to liberalize the strict standards
developed in the 1930's and early 1940's. On the facts of
Dombrowski, the Court held that federal intervention was justified
because defending against the state criminal charge would not
ensure protection of the plaintiffs' first amendment rights. The
plaintiffs had alleged that their rights were in danger because
the statutes in question, Louisiana's subversive activities laws,
were overbroad on their face, and because the state prosecution
was undertaken in bad faith for the purpose of discouraging
protected civil rights activity. The Court distinguished Douglas v.
City of Jeannette on the ground that the plaintiffs in Douglas
had neither questioned the facial validity of the city ordinance
requiring door-to-door solicitors to pay a license tax, 56 nor
been "threatened with any injury other than that incidental to
every criminal proceeding brought lawfully and in good faith
.... "' In Dombrowski, on the other hand, the plaintiffs alleged
that "a substantial loss or impairment of freedoms of expression"
would occur if they were forced to await the outcome of pro-
tracted state court litigation. 58 Noting that all statutes that regu-
late expression risk inhibiting the exercise of first amendment
rights, and that this danger is particularly acute when the statute
aff'd, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per curiam), the district court rejected the contention that it
should abstain on comity grounds from enjoining enforcement of state statutes and
municipal ordinances containing criminal sanctions designed to maintain segregated
buses: "The short answer is that doctrine has no application where the plaintiffs com-
plain that they are being deprived of constitutional civil rights, for the protection of
which the Federal courts have a responsibility as heavy as that which rests on the State
courts." Id. at 713. Again, the Supreme Court affirmed. 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per
curiam). See also Morrison v. Davis, 252 F.2d 102 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 968
(1958), in which the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision to enjoin enforce-
ment of a Louisiana public carrier statute similar to that invalidated in Browder v. Gayle:
[Browder v. Gayle] disposes of the contention that the federal court should not
grant an injunction against the application or enforcement of a state statute,
the violation of which carries criminal sanctions .... To the extent that this is
inconsistent with Douglas v. City of Jeannette .... we must consider [that] case
modified.
Id. at 103 (citation omitted). During this period, the Supreme Court also sustained a
temporary injunction enjoining the enforcement of a Louisiana statute that imposed
criminal sanctions on social or fraternal organizations that failed to file annual member-
ship lists with the Secretary of State. Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S.
293 (1961).
s 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
56 Id. at 489-90.
5 7 Id. at 485 (quoting Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 317 U.S. 157, 164 (1943)).8Id. at 486.
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is alleged to have "an overbroad sweep," the Court found "[t]he
assumption that defense of a criminal prosecution will generally
assure ample vindication of constitutional rights [to be] un-
founded in such cases. '59 The Court thus concluded that the
plaintiffs' "allegations, if true, clearly show irreparable injury.
'60
Dombrowski, however, was limited only six years later by
Younger v. Harris6 1 and its companion cases.62 These decisions
signalled the reemergence of the strict standards that had been
enunciated in Douglas but largely ignored for thirty years. In
Younger v. Harris, Harris was charged with violating California's
Criminal Syndicalism Act.63 He filed suit in federal court, alleg-
ing that the prosecution and the existence of the California
statute chilled the exercise of his first amendment rights, and
he asked that the district attorney be enjoined from prosecut-
ing him. A three-judge district court, holding the statute uncon-
stitutionally vague and overbroad, issued the injunction. The Su-
preme Court reversed, relying on principles of equity, comity,
and federalism. 64 The Court stated that "courts of equity should
not act, and particularly should not act to restrain a criminal
prosecution, when the moving party has an adequate remedy
at law and will not suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable
relief. ' 65 This doctrine was stated to be particularly "important
under our Constitution, in order to . . . avoid a duplication of
legal proceedings and legal sanctions where a single suit would
be adequate to protect the rights asserted. 66 The Court observed
further that the nonintervention doctrine was "reinforced by an
even more vital consideration, the notion of 'comity,' that is, a
proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that





61 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
62 Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971);
Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971); Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971); Byrne v.
Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971).
63 CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11400-01 (West 1970).
64 The Court noted the long-standing congressional policy against federal interven-
tion in state court proceedings, citing the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970),
see note 19 supra, but did not discuss whether the Act "would in and of itself be control-
ling under the circumstances of this case." 401 U.S. at 54.
"s 401 U.S. at 43-44.
66 Id. at 44.
67Id.
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The Younger Court cited its previous decisions in the area6 8
for the propositions that injunctions against state prosecutorial
officials should be issued only "under extraordinary circum-
stances where the danger of irreparable loss is both great and
immediate," and that "[t]he accused should first set up and rely
upon his defense in the state courts ... unless it plainly appears
that this course would not afford adequate protection. '69 The
Court added that "[clertain types of injury, in particular, the
cost, anxiety, and inconvenience of having to defend against a
single criminal prosecution, could not by themselves be con-
sidered 'irreparable' . . ." Rather, "the threat to plaintiff's fed-
erally protected rights must be one that cannot be eliminated by
his defense against a single criminal prosecution.
' 70
68 In particular, the Court cited Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943),
discussed in notes 48-49 supra & accompanying text; Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387
(1941), discussed in note 42 supra; Beal v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 312 U.S. 45 (1941), dis-
cussed in note 42 supra; Spielman Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89 (1935), discussed
in note 42 supra; Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240 (1926), discussed in text accompanying
notes 35-39 supra.
69 401 U.S. at 45 (quoting Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240, 243-44 (1926)).
70 Id. at 46. The Court concluded by carefully limiting Dombrowski to its facts. Al-
though admitting that "there are some statements in the Dombrowski opinion that would
seem to support" the argument that "federal courts may give equitable relief, without
regard to any showing of bad faith or harassment, whenever a state statute is found 'on
its face' to be vague or overly broad, in violation of the first Amendment," id. at 50, the
Court held that the chilling effect on the free exercise of first amendment freedoms
caused by prosecution under a statute regulating expression "should not by itself justify
federal intervention," id. Because there was no suggestion that the single prosecution
against Harris was brought in bad faith, and because the injury he faced was solely
"that incidental to every criminal proceeding brought lawfully and in good faith," id. at
49 (quoting Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 164 (1943)), Harris was in-
structed to seek vindication of his rights in state court.
In the companion case of Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971), the Court held
that the Younger rule applies with equal force to actions for declaratory relief when
issuance of a declaratory judgment would have "virtually the same practical impact as a
formal injunction .... ." Id. at 72. The Court reasoned that declaring New York's
criminal anarchy statute unconstitutional would halt the plaintiffs' prosecution as effec-
tively as an injunction and thus refused to make such a declaration. Dyson v. Stein, 401
U.S. 200 (1971) (per curiam), and Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971) (per curiam),
were factually similar to Younger in that Dyson and Byrne involved requests to declare
state criminal statutes unconstitutional and to enjoin their enforcement against the
plaintiffs. The Supreme Court did not order dismissal of these actions, however, but
instead remanded them for further consideration of the nature and extent of the injury
suffered. In Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971), the three-judge lower court upheld
the constitutionality of a Louisiana obscenity statute while ruling that the arrest of the
plaintiffs and the seizure of allegedly obscene materials pursuant to the statute was
invalid for lack of a prior adversary hearing on the character of the materials. Although
the lower court did not enjoin present or future prosecutions, it did order suppression
and return of the seized materials. The Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that the
suppression of the materials obviously would result in the effective termination of the
case, and thus would have the same effect as an injunction issued against the prosecu-
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Younger made another extremely important, but less obvi-
ous, change in the law. As was noted above,' 1 when the Court
first addressed the nonintervention issue in In re Sawyer in 1888,
it barred without exception federal injunctions against pending
state prosecutions that antedated the federal suit. The Court
adhered steadfastly to this rule in the years following the Sawyer
decision.7 2 Thus, the propriety of federal intervention had really
been in issue almost exclusively in suits to enjoin prospective,
rather than pending, prosecutions.7 3 Given this historical de-
tion. In Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971), the Court reversed the lower court's
decision that an Illinois statute, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 12-6 (Smith-Hurd 1972), was
void for overbreadth. The Court held that the plaintiffs failed to show that they were
in any jeopardy of suffering irreparable harm. Indeed, no one was being prosecuted or
even threatened with prosecution under the challenged statute.
71 See text accompanying notes 23-24 supra.
72 For example, in Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445 (1927), the Court ex-
plicitly reaffirmed this rule. In Cline, a number of dairy companies that were charged
with alleged violations of Colorado's antitrust act, along with several individuals
threatened with prosecution, sought relief in the federal courts. A three-judge district
court held the act unconstitutional and enjoined all pending and threatened prosecu-
tions. The court relied on the following dictum in Davis & Farnum Mfg. Co. v. Los
Angeles, 189 U.S. 207, 218 (1903):
It would seem that, if there were jurisdiction in a court of equity to enjoin the
invasion of property rights through the instrumentality of an unconstitutional
law, that jurisdiction would not be ousted by the fact that the State had chosen
to assert its power to enforce such law by indictment or other criminal pro-
ceeding.
Beatrice Creamery Co. v. Cline, 9 F.2d 176, 181 (D. Colo. 1925), rev'd in part sub nom.
Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445 (1927). The Supreme Court reversed with re-
gard to the pending cases, relying on the following contrary dictum in Ex parte Young:
"But the Federal court cannot, of course, interfere in a case where the proceedings
were already pending in a state court." 274 U.S. at 453 (quoting Ex parte Young, 209
U.S. 123, 162 1908)).
Not until 1951, in Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117 (1951), did the Court indicate
some willingness to permit lower federal courts to enjoin a pending state prosecution in
exceptional circumstances. In Stefanelli, the Court refused to grant an injunction to
suppress illegally seized evidence in a pending state prosecution. After reviewing the
principles of equity, comity, and federalism the Court noted that "[i]f these considera-
tions limit federal courts in restraining State prosecutions merely threatened, how much
more cogent are they to prevent federal interference with proceedings once begun." Id.
at 122-23. The Court may have been implying here that although the Court might be
more reluctant to intervene in pending prosecutions, essentially the same standards that
apply in cases involving threatened prosecutions also apply when pending prosecutions
are involved.
73 See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965); Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319
U.S. 157 (1943); Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387 (1941); Beal v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 312
U.S. 45 (1941); Spielman Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89 (1935); Fenner v.
Boykin, 271 U.S. 240 (1926); and Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). All of the above
cited cases involved merely the threat of state prosecution at the time the federal action
was begun. After Dombrowski, however, the lower federal courts did not hesitate to
apply the new standards to pending state criminal proceedings. See Wechsler, supra note
16, at 861 n.542.
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velopment, it is remarkable that Younger and its companion cases
limited the application of nonintervention principles to instances
involving pending prosecutions, and "express[ed] no view about
the circumstances under which federal courts may act when
there is no prosecution pending in state courts at the time the
federal proceeding is begun. '7 4 Even more remarkable is the
Court's statement made soon after Younger in Lake Carriers' As-
sociation v. MacMullan7 5 that the relevant principles of equity,
comity, and federalism "have little force in the absence of a
pending state proceeding."
76
Subsequently, in Steffel v. Thompson, 77 the Court held that
the threat of arrest and prosecution under an allegedly invalid
state statute permitted the complainant to seek a declaratory
judgment regarding the constitutionality of the statute without a
showing of bad faith enforcement or other special circum-
stances. 78 In Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc.,79 the Court extended the
Steffel rule to requests for preliminary injunctive relief. Thus,
after originally having, held that a federal court could enjoin a
threatened prosecution only in special circumstances and could
never enjoin a pending prosecution, the Court has now held that
a pending prosecution can be enjoined in special circumstances
and that a threatened prosecution can be enjoined merely upon
a showing that the state statute under which the prosecution
would be brought is unconstitutional.80
74 401 U.S. at 41; accord, id. at 55 (Stewart & Harlan, JJ., concurring); Samuels v.
Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 73-74 (1971).
,s 406 U.S. 498 (1972).
'1Id. at 509. As the Court explained in Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974):
When no state criminal proceeding is pending at the time the federal com-
plaint is filed, federal intervention does not result in duplicative legal proceed-
ings or disruption of the state criminal justice system; nor can federal interven-
tion, in that circumstance, be interpreted as reflecting negatively upon the state
court's ability to enforce constitutional principles. In addition, while a pending
state prosecution provides the federal plaintiff with a concrete opportunity to
vindicate his constitutional rights, a refusal on the part of the federal courts to
intervene when no state proceeding is pending may place the hapless plaintiff
between the Scylla of intentionally flouting state law and the Charybdis of for-
going what he believes to be constitutionally protected activity in order to avoid
becoming enmeshed in a criminal proceeding.
Id. at 462.
" 415 U.S. 452 (1974).
78 The police had twice threatened to arrest petitioner if he did not stop hand-
billing on an exterior sidewalk of a shopping center. His companion, who continued
leafleting, was arrested. Id. at 455-56.
79 422 U.S. 922 (1975).
80 In Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975), the Court limited severely the avail-
ability of the federal forum in cases in which a state prosecution is merely threatened.
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III. DEFINING STANDARDS FOR
FEDERAL INTERVENTION
Over the years, the Supreme Court has applied the noninter-
vention doctrine in a flexible manner-construing it to permit
federal intervention in state proceedings when the Court sought
an active role in vindicating constitutional rights, and interpret-
ing it to forbid intervention when the Court eschewed federal
court involvement in state affairs. In defining the scope of per-
missible federal relief in civil rights actions brought to obtain
modification of constitutionally deficient state criminal practices
and procedures, the federal courts should avoid the more ex-
For almost 100 years, only state proceedings that antedated the filing of the federal suit
were considered "pending" for comity purposes. Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 3
n.1 (1974); Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445, 453 (1927); Ex parte Young, 209
U.S. 123, 162 (1908); In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200, 211 (1888). In Hicks, however, the
Supreme Court signaled an end to this policy, holding that "where state criminal pro-
ceedings are begun against the federal plaintiffs after the federal complaint is filed but
before any proceedings of substance on the merits have taken place in the federal
court, the principles of Younger v. Harris should apply in full force." 422 U.S. at 349. As
Justice Stewart pointed out in dissent, this new rule does not eliminate the unseemly
race to the courthouse door, id. at 354 (Stewart, J., with whom Douglas, Brennan &
Marshall, JJ., join dissenting), and unfortunately, the rule "is an open invitation to state
officials to institute state proceedings in order to defeat federal jurisdiction," id. at 357
(Stewart, J., dissenting). Moreover, the precise meaning of "proceedings of substance on
the merits" is far from clear. Id. at 353-54 n. I (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Numerous problems concerning the threatened/pending distinction have yet to be
resolved. For example, the Court has never made clear what action by state officials is
necessary to begin a criminal prosecution for Younger purposes. The courts have as-
sumed generally that a prosecution begins with either an indictment or the filing of
formal charges. See, e.g., Spielman Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89, 96 (1935);
Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445, 452 (1927); Jones v. Wade, 479 F.2d 1176, 1181
(5th Cir. 1973); Marks v. City of Newport, 344 F. Supp. 675, 677 (E.D. Ky. 1972). Some
courts, however, have held that a prosecution is instituted by an arrest. See Rialto
Theatre Co. v. City of Wilmington, 440 F.2d 1326, 1327 (3d Cir. 1971); Eve Prods.,
Inc. v. Shannon, 439 F.2d 1073, 1074 (8th Cir. 1971). A few courts have held that even
more preliminary actions suffice to invoke Younger. See, e.g., Modern Social Educ., Inc.
v. Preller, 353 F. Supp. 173, 179-80 (D. Md. 1973), modified sub nom. Age of Majority
Educ. Corp. v. Preller, 512 F.2d 1241, 1243-45 (4th Cir. 1975) (application for search
warrant begins prosecution for Younger purposes); Puglia v. Cotter, 333 F. Supp. 940,
941 (D. Conn.) (semble), affd, 450 F.2d 1362 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1073
(1972) (Younger applies in action to halt grand jury investigation).
The courts have also not made clear whether prospective prosecutions can be en-
joined when such relief would effectively halt a pending prosecution against either the
moving party or someone else. Compare Hicks v. Miranda, supra, with Doran v. Salem
Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 928-29 (1975). See also Rakes v. Coleman, 359 F. Supp. 370,
373-79 (E.D. Va. 1973). See generally Comment, Federal Equitable Restraint: A Younger
Analysis in New Settings, 35 MD. L. REv. 483, 493 n.52 (1976); Note, supra note 33, at
980-87. For a well-reasoned discussion criticizing the use of the threatened/pending dis-
tinction to determine the appropriateness of federal relief, see Whitten, Federal Declara-
tory and Injunctive Interference with State Court Proceedings: The Supreme Court and the Limits
of Judicial Discretion, 53 N.C.L. REv. 591, 675-83 (1975).
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treme positions taken in the past and instead adopt a middle
course that would allow them to play an important but realisti-
cally limited role in enforcing the constitutional rights of persons
involved in the state criminal process.
In formulating the appropriate standards for federal inter-
vention, this Article will first examine the proper scope of the
Younger doctrine. The starting point for this inquiry is the state-
ment in Younger that "courts of equity should not act, and par-
ticularly should not act to restrain a criminal prosecution, when
the moving party has an adequate remedy at law and will not
suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief."'' l Federal
courts are simply not able to monitor all aspects of state practice
and procedure, or to provide individual review each time a de-
fendant's rights are arguably violated in the course of a state
prosecution; therefore, a federal court should not grant coercive
relief directed against a state prosecution except under extraor-
dinary circumstances. Federal courts should deny requests for
relief by individual criminal defendants that would necessitate
federal review of substantive state court rulings regarding issues
considered traditionally during the course of the state court pro-
ceeding.
The Younger doctrine should also apply to preclude blanket
injunctions when such orders would replace individual factual
determinations or would require second-guessing the discre-
tionary decisions of state judges. When the proper relief de-
pends on individual determinations, relief by blanket injunctions
will be insufficient for some individuals and unwarranted for
others. Furthermore, the policies of federalism and comity re-
quire application of the Younger doctrine when plaintiffs seek
such extensive reform of the state criminal process that the fed-
eral district court would be required to oversee the day-to-day
workings of the state judicial system.
On the other hand, because the policies of the Younger
doctrine concern the relationship between the federal and the
state courts, Younger should not restrict a federal court when the
requested relief would not interfere with substantive aspects of
pending state judicial proceedings. Thus, a federal court should
be permitted to grant relief concerning matters ancillary or un-
related to the criminal proceeding that cannot be raised in de-
fense against the prosecution itself. Federal courts have ordered,
81 401 U.S. at 43-44 (emphasis supplied).
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and should continue to order, simple procedural reforms82 to
ensure that state criminal processes affecting large numbers of
people meet minimum constitutional standards. Similarly, the
policies of the Younger doctrine do not apply when the requested
relief is directed at the unconstitutional actions of nonjudicial
state officials. Finally, Younger should not bar class actions
brought by persons requesting equitable relief from probable
future arrests or prosecutions.
In addition to identifying the situations in which the Younger
doctrine should or should not apply, examining the proper
scope of the exceptions to the Younger rule in those cases in
which the doctrine ordinarily would apply is also necessary. The
Court in Younger stated that the federal courts should intervene
to protect the constitutional rights of citizens when the com-
plainants will (1) suffer irreparable injury if denied relief and (2)
have no adequate remedy at law. There is some dispute, how-
ever, over what constitutes an "irreparable" injury and an "ade-
quate" remedy. Although the "cost, anxiety, and inconvenience
of having to defend against a single criminal prosecution"83 do
not alone constitute irreparable injury, the harm may become
irreparable if a person has to defend against multiple prosecu-
tions, or if a class of persons is subjected to unconstitutional state
practices. Moreover, unlawful imprisonment inevitably causes ir-
reparable harm.
To be considered adequate, a remedy at law should afford
the complainant a timely and complete resolution of his federal
claims, either through defense against the pending criminal pro-
ceeding or through some other means. When no state procedure
exists for review of the federal claim, or when a theoretical
remedy is inadequate in practice to protect the complainant's
constitutional rights, the complainant lacks an adequate alternate
remedy to federal declaratory or injunctive relief.
A. Defining the Proper Scope of the Younger Doctrine
1. Situations in Which Younger Should Apply
The principles of comity, equity, and federalism, which
form the basis of the Younger doctrine, concern primarily the
8 2 E.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (requiring a hearing before parole
is revoked).
83 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46 (1971).
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relationship between the federal and the state courts. 84 There-
fore, the Younger doctrine should bar relief requested by indi-
vidual criminal defendants that would hinder seriously the or-
derly adjudication of state prosecutions by involving federal
courts in the piecemeal determination of issues considered tradi-
tionally during the course of state court proceedings. State pro-
secutions would be disrupted intolerably if each defendant could
obtain interlocutory federal review of every determination by a
state judge that had constitutional implications.
A number of federal courts have adopted this position. In
Bryant v. Morgan,"5 the Fifth Circuit cited Younger in rejecting
summarily a constitutional attack on trial jury selection proce-
dures brought by persons under indictment in state court.8 6 In
Manns v. Koontz,8 7 the Fourth Circuit held that Younger barred a
suit contesting the constitutionality of a state law that placed
exclusive original jurisdiction of the complainant's criminal case
in a domestic relations court that did not afford a jury trial.88
Similarly, in United States ex rel. Hudson v. Wollenzien,8 9 a Wiscon-
sin district court relied on Younger in dismissing a case in which
the complainant sought a declaration that he was entitled to a
jury determination on the issue of the reasonableness of his re-
fusal to submit to a blood alcohol test in proceedings brought to
suspend his driving privileges. Granting the relief requested in
Bryant, Manns, or Hudson would have blocked or substantially
84 See text accompanying notes 61-74 supra.
85 451 F.2d 354 (5th Cir. 1971).
86 Similarly, in Puglia v. Cotter, 333 F. Supp. 940 (D. Conn.), aff'd, 450 F.2d 1362
(2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1073 (1972), a Connecticut district court held that
Younger barred an attack, brought by a person subpoenaed to testify before a grand
jury, on Connecticut's one-man grand jury system. Cf. Penn v. Eubanks, 360 F. Supp.
699 (M.D. Ala. 1973), in which an Alabama district court found "no questions of comity
presented" by a suit challenging jury selection procedures in Montgomery County. Id.
at 701 n. 1. In so holding, the district court relied on the fact that the plaintiffs were not
facing criminal prosecution in state court, but were instead free citizens challenging the
systematic exclusion from jury service of persons of their racial, sexual, and income
groups. This decision is correct, because the plaintiffs obviously could not raise their
claims in defense of nonexistent prosecutions. Furthermore, because the plaintiffs were
not awaiting trial, equitable relief that would not unduly interfere with pending crimi-
nal trials could be fashioned by modification of jury selection procedures over time.
Moreover, suits similar to Penn were approved by the Supreme Court in Carter v. Jury
Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320 (1970) and Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970). But see
Bradley v. Judges of the Superior Court, 372 F. Supp. 26, 30 (C.D. Cal. 1974) (comity
considerations suggest that state courts should consider plaintiff's contentions first).
87 451 F.2d 1344 (4th Cir. 1971).
88 The state law did allow for a jury trial on appeal to the local court of general
jurisdiction. VA. CODE § 16.1-214 (Repl. Vol. 1975).
89 345 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
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impeded state criminal prosecutions. Furthermore, the claims
raised in these cases all related to jury matters, which tradition-
ally have been considered first in the context of the state pros-
ecution. Thus, the courts held correctly that Younger barred
relief.90
The federal courts have also properly refused to grant re-
quests for blanket injunctions, particularly when such orders
would supplant individual factual determinations or would re-
quire second-guessing discretionary decisions of state judges. In
Wallace v. Kern (II),91 the Second Circuit vacated a lower court
directive that each detainee awaiting trial before the Kings
County Supreme Court for more than six months (nine months
when the detainee is accused of murder) be allowed to demand a
trial and be released on his own recognizance if not brought to
trial within forty-five days of demand. The Second Circuit, rely-
ing on the authority of Barker v. Wingo,92 held that "[r]elief from
90 The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit faced an analogous problem in
Guerro v. Mulhearn, 498 F.2d 1249 (1st Cir. 1974). In Guerro, while appeals from their
convictions were pending in state court, plaintiffs filed a federal action seeking money
damages against state prosecutorial officials for alleged violations of their civil rights
committed during the course of their state criminal proceedings. In analyzing the com-
ity considerations, the court held that "[t]he touchstone for any decision to defer a civil
rights damage action which is parallel to state criminal proceedings is whether the fed-
eral court will be making rulings whose necessary implication would be to call in ques-
tion the validity of the state conviction." Id. at 1254. The court noted that if a federal
court were to make such rulings, "the potential for federal-state friction is obvious,"
because "[t]he federal ruling would embarrass, and could even intrude into, the state
proceedings," causing delay or derailment of the state action. Id. at 1253. The court was
careful to point out, however, that deferral would not always be appropriate because a
"denial of constitutionally protected rights," even though occurring in the course of
criminal proceedings, "may only be marginally relevant, or may even be entirely ir-
relevant, to the trial and appeal." Id. at 1254. But cf. Martin v. Merola, 532 F.2d 191,
194-95 (2d Cir. 1976) (even though such a suit would not have interfered directly with
the criminal proceedings, the court cited principles of comity in holding that a civil
rights suit alleging a violation of the plaintiff's right to a fair trial could not be brought
until after the criminal proceedings had terminated); Fulford v. Klein, 529 F.2d 377
(5th Cir. 1976) (relying on principles of comity, the court held that a claim under § 1983
could not be brought by a convicted defendant whose case was on appeal until all state
remedies had been exhausted).
Federal courts have held quite properly that civil rights damage actions against
state prosecutorial or police officials for misconduct are not-barred by Younger when the
state criminal proceedings are completely concluded. Sartin v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety,
535 F.2d 430 (8th Cir. 1976); cf. Bursey v. Weatherford, 528 F.2d 483 (4th Cir. 1975),
cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 3165 (1976). The Supreme Court recently limited such actions in
another way, however, by holding state prosecutors who act within the scope of their
duties immune from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S.
409 (1976).
91 499 F.2d 1345 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 947 (1975).
92 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
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unconstitutional delays in criminal trials is not available in
wholesale lots." 93 The circuit court found the imposition of an
automatic six-month time limit to be "curiously arbitrary" and
concluded that the decision lacked the "fine, albeit difficult,
case-by-case determination of whether a prejudicial delay exists
as to any individual inmate.
94
The Younger doctrine has also been applied correctly to bar
relief that would entail extensive reform of a state's criminal
process and thereby cast "a federal district court in the role of
receiver for a state judicial branch. ' 95 For example, in O'Shea v.
Littleton96 the plaintiffs mounted a frontal attack on the entire
criminal justice system of Cairo, Illinois. The plaintiffs accused
the state's attorney, his investigator, and the police commissioner
of intentionally practicing racial discrimination in the perfor-
mance of their duties, with the alleged result that the law was
deliberately applied more harshly against blacks than against
whites. The plaintiffs also claimed that a county magistrate and a
judge had employed unconstitutional bail procedures that im-
93 499 F.2d at 1351.
4 Id. at 1350. Similar considerations underlie certain Second Circuit decisions in-
volving the right to counsel. In Bedrosian v. Mintz, 518 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1975), the
plaintiffs requested that the court direct a state judge to assign out-of-state counsel to
represent them on criminal indictments arising out of the Attica riot. The state judge
had denied the application because he was unfamiliar with the competence of the out-
of-state lawyers. Additionally, the state court had found that there were local counsel
who were willing to accept assignment and felt that the added expenses involved in
assigning out-of-state lawyers would unduly burden the taxpayers. Id. at 398. The Sec-
ond Circuit held that the state court's ruling did not violate the plaintiffs' sixth amend-
ment rights. The court also held that the state court's ruling was a discretionary deci-
sion on a local matter, not correctable by federal injunction. The court, in a footnote,
cited Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117 (1951), for the proposition that federal courts
should refrain from piecemeal intervention concerning collateral issues. It quoted dic-
tum from Stefanelli that included the "[a]sserted unconstitutionality . . . in the failure to
appoint counsel" as an example of the type of collateral issue that should not be de-
cided. 518 F.2d at 399 n.5 (quoting Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 123 (1951)). It
must be remembered, however, that Stefanelli was written over a decade before
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), and referred to the then discretionary
appointment of counsel. Nonetheless, the concern of both the Stefanelli and Bedrosian
courts was that a federal court not substitute its determinations of fact for those of the
state court.
In Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 453 F.2d 12 (2d Cir.
1971), the plaintiff class requested appointment of counsel before or during investiga-
tive in-prison questioning. The court, in rejecting this request, noted that several of the
inmate-plaintiffs already were represented by zealous counsel. The court also noted the
lack of substantial evidence of any improper questioning of prisoners. Moreover, the
court stressed that any person ultimately indicted would be assigned counsel and would
have the opportunity to suppress any improperly solicited statements. Id. at 20-2 1.
" Ad Hoc Comm. on Judicial Admin. v. Massachusetts, 488 F.2d 1241, 1246 (1st
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 986 (1974).
96 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
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posed harsher sentences and conditions on black defendants,
and that required indigents to pay jury fees. Finally, the plain-
tiffs charged all the state officials with intentionally using their
powers to deter the plaintiffs from peacefully protesting racist
practices in Cairo. The plaintiffs sought far-reaching injunctive
relief against these discriminatory practices.
The Supreme Court dismissed the case on standing grounds
because "[n]one of the named plaintiffs [was] identified as him-
self having suffered any injury in the manner specified"97 and
because the prospect of future injury was tenuous. The Court
stated in dicta, however, that the kind of relief sought by the
plaintiffs necessarily would entail "abrasive and unmanageable
intercession" 98 into the day-to-day conduct of local criminal pro-
ceedings. Because the plaintiffs alleged the existence of perva-
sive racial and wealth discrimination throughout the criminal
process, effective relief would have required a wholesale federal
take-over of Cairo's prosecutorial and judicial systems. By seek-
ing "an injunction aimed at controlling or preventing the oc-
currence of specific events that might take place in the course of
future state criminal trials," the plaintiffs appeared to "contem-
plate interruption of state proceedings to adjudicate assertions of
noncompliance" in an "ongoing federal audit of state criminal
proceedings." 99 The amorphous nature of the class and the
vague allegations of injury compounded the problem of fashion-
ing precise and effective relief. Thus, the Court found that
granting the relief requested "would indirectly accomplish the
kind of interference that Younger v. Harris ... and related cases
sought to prevent." 00
97 Id. at 495.9 8 Id. at 504.
99 Id. at 500.
100 Id. In Gardner v. Luckey, 500 F.2d 712 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
841 (1976), the Fifth Circuit held that the considerations outlined in O'Shea v. Littleton
barred a class action brought by convicted state prisoners seeking broad declaratory and
injunctive relief against the Florida Public Defender Offices. The plaintiffs, who had
been represented by individual public defenders, asserted that the representation failed
to meet minimum constitutional standards. The plaintiffs made "inadequate funding
and excessive caseloads a key claim in their suit," id. at 713, and asked the court to
remedy these problems. As in O'Shea, the court held that the named plaintiffs lacked
standing to sue because none alleged "that he himself was injured by the conduct of the
Public Defenders." Id. at 714. Furthermore, the court noted that effective relief would
interrupt state prosecutions during the period necessary to adjudicate assertions of
noncompliance, and would require the kind of ongoing audit of state criminal proceed-
ings condemned in O'Shea. Id. at 715. Thus, the court denied the requested relief.
Similarly, in Karr v. Blay, 413 F. Supp. 579 (N.D. Ohio 1976), the federal district court
refused to grant injunctive relief despite a finding that state judges had acted uncon-
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In Ad Hoc Committee on Judicial Administration v. Massa-
chusetts' 01 the plaintiffs alleged that the state's "failure to provide
'court facilities, judges, clerical personnel, and other facilities'
violate[d] their Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights," and
they asked the federal judiciary "to order enlargement and re-
structuring of the entire state court system."' 0 2 The First Circuit
held that the case was nonjusticiable. Noting that the complaint
centered on the existence of substantial delays in the state courts,
the court pointed out that granting relief would entail the court's
performing the impossible task of "translat[ing] the due process
clause into formulae and timetables establishing the maximum
permissible delay" in "all types and classes of litigation."' 03 Fash-
ioning a remedy and determining whether the state was in suffi-
cient compliance with the court's orders would be equally
difficult.'0 4 The court concluded that although "[t]he dictates of
a federal court might seem to promise easy relief ... they would
more likely frustrate and delay meaningful reform ... in a sys-
tem so complex."
0 5
2. Situations in Which Younger Should Not Apply
As noted above, 10 6 the policies of the Younger doctrine in-
volve primarily the relationship between the federal and the
state courts. Therefore, the doctrine should not apply when the
relief sought entails virtually no interference with substantive
aspects of pending state judicial proceedings, even if other as-
pects of the state criminal process are involved. For example, if
suit were brought against state officials for disseminating incom-
plete or erroneous criminal histories, °t1 or against municipal of-
ficials in charge of courthouse detention facilities for refusing to
stitutionally by confining indigents who were unable to pay fines. The court stated that
"principles of equity, comity, and federalism prevent this Court from imposing an on-
going federal audit and day-to-day supervision of state judicial proceedings." Id. at 585.
See also Bonner v. Circuit Court, 526 F.2d 1331 (8th Cir. 1975) (en banc), cert. denied, 96
S. Ct. 1418 (1976), which cited O'Shea and Younger in dismissing an action brought by
20 black prisoners claiming that local judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys had
joined in a racially motivated conspiracy to coerce guilty pleas. Compare Gardner v.
Luckey, supra, with Wallace v. Kern (I), 392 F. Supp. 834 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 481 F.2d 621
(2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1135 (1974).
101 488 F.2d 1241 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 986 (1974).
1
02 Id. at 1243.
113 Id. at 1244.




106 See text accompanying notes 61-74 supra.
107 See, e.g., Tatum v. Rogers, No. 75 Civ. 2782-CBM (S.D.N.Y., filed June 10,
1975). See also Paul v. Davis, 96 S. Ct. 1155 (1976).
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provide adequate facilities for pretrial detainees to consult pri-
vately with their attorneys, 108 or against court reporters for fail-
ing to transcribe trial minutes promptly, 10 9 the federal courts
should be allowed to grant relief directed against these nonjudi-
cial officials as long as the relief sought does not interfere with
pending judicial proceedings.
In Cinema Classics, Ltd. v. Busch," 0 the plaintiffs sought the
return of a large quantity of allegedly obscene materials, which
they claimed where seized illegally by state officials. The district
court granted relief on the ground that the mass seizure, con-
ducted without a prior adversary hearing or a judicial determi-
nation that the material was obscene, constituted an illegal prior
restraint on the dissemination of material presumptively pro-
tected by the first amendment. The court found Younger and its
companion cases inapplicable, because the state officials would
be left with ample copies of each item seized for use as evidence
in the criminal proceedings. Thus, an injunction ordering the
return of most of the material would "in no way halt, inhibit,
prejudice, or handicap the state in the prosecution . . . now
pending or any other prosecution that may later be com-
menced.""'
108 See, e.g., Wallace v. Kern (III), No. 72 C 898, (E.D.N.Y., Feb. 18, 1975), rev'd,
520 F.2d 400 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1109 (1976). See also Jordan v. Mal-
colm, No. 75 Civ. 1971-CHT (S.D.N.Y., filed Mar. 4, 1975).
109 See, e.g., Simmons v. Maslysnky, 45 F.R.D. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1968); Washingtdn v.
Official Court Steno., 251 F. Supp. 945 (E.D. Pa. 1966). See also Isrile v. Benjamin, No.
74 Civ. 4710-WC (S.D.N.Y., filed Oct. 25, 1975).
110 339 F. Supp. 43 (C.D. Cal.) (three-judge court), aff'd, 409 U.S. 807 (1972), 414
U.S. 946 (1973).
"I Id. at 49. See also Bradford v. Wade, 376 F. Supp. 45 (N.D. Tex. 1974); Sooner
State News Agency, Inc. v. Fallis, 367 F. Supp. 523, 530 (N.D. Okla. 1973); Star Dis-
tribs., Ltd. v. Hogan, 337 F. Supp. 1362, 1365 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
The Supreme Court in dicta suggested recently that the policies that underlie the
Younger doctrine are equally applicable to cases in which the plaintiffs seek relief against
unconstitutional action by nonjudicial state officials, even when such relief would not
involve any interference with state criminal proceedings. In Rizzo v. Goode, 96 S. Ct.
598 (1976), the Court reversed a lower court decision requiring the Philadelphia Police
Department to submit a plan for the improvement of the handling of citizen com-
plaints. The Court based the reversal on the absence of a sufficient case or controversy
between the individually named plaintiffs and defendants, and upon the failure of
plaintiffs to demonstrate that the Mayor and high police officials affirmatively au-
thorized or approved police misconduct. Id. at 604-06. The Court, however, went on to
state that:
the principles of federalism which play such an important part in governing
the relationship between federal courts and state governments . . . likewise
have applicability where injunctive relief is sought not against the judicial
branch of the state government, but against those in charge of an executive
branch of an agency of state or local governments such as respondents here.
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A more difficult question concerning the application of the
Younger doctrine is presented in cases in which the plaintiffs raise
claims of constitutional deficiencies in pretrial practices and pro-
cedures. When such claims cannot be raised easily in defense
against state prosecutions, even though the claims might be
raised in state habeas proceedings, and when granting the re-
quested relief would not involve enjoining the plaintiffs' pros-
ecutions either directly or indirectly, but would result in some
interference with the state criminal process, the Younger doctrine
normally should not be applied. Although the plaintiffs in such
cases may succeed in obtaining federal relief if state post-
conviction remedies are deemed inadequate, 1 2 regardless of
whether the plaintiffs can bring their case within the exceptions
to the Younger rule 1 3 Younger should not apply to these cases in
the first instance because of the tangential effect of federal relief
on the state prosecutions. Were the Younger doctrine held not to
apply to cases involving challenges to pretrial practices and pro-
cedures, a federal court could grant systemic relief, which would
be otherwise unavailable, to a large class of criminal defendants.
Lower court decisions in cases exhibiting these characteris-
tics are evenly split between those allowing relief and those deny-
ing it. The Third Circuit recently granted relief in Conover v.
Montemuro," 4 which involved a constitutional challenge to the
intake procedures of the Philadelphia family court. The plain-
tiffs requested injunctive and declaratory relief on behalf of
themselves and all other juvenile arrestees who were subjected to
a standardless "intake interview" by probation officers, and who
were denied a preliminary hearing. The court held that Younger
was not controlling because modification of intake procedures
would not necessarily hinder the state adjudicative process or
substitute federal fact-finding for that of the state court.' 5
Judge Adams elaborated on this point in his concurring opinion:
[P]laintiffs are here attempting to secure only a federal
court judgment that holding juveniles without a pre-
Id. at 608. Rizzo represents an unwarranted limitation on the ability of the federal
courts to fashion remedies for violations of federal constitutional rights. See Letter,
supra note 2, at 2. If carried to its logical conclusion, Rizzo could result in a ban on all
federal suits directed against state officials who allegedly violate such rights.
112 See note 171 infra.
"I For a discussion of the exceptions to the Younger rule, see text accompanying
notes 146-72 infra.
114 477 F.2d 1073 (3d Cir. 1973).
115 Id. at 1082.
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liminary hearing or an equivalent proceeding to ascer-
tain probable cause is unconstitutional. Under these cir-
cumstances, a federal court's declaration of unconstitu-
tionality or an injunction requiring the officials to insti-
tute a preliminary hearing procedure would in no way
adversely affect the state's legitimate interest in conduct-
ing its delinquency hearings without direct interference.
No delinquency hearings would be enjoined. Indeed,
the sole effect of giving the plaintiffs the relief they seek
would be a requirement that, in the future, preliminary
hearings or an equivalent proceeding to determine
probable cause be held.
16
Similarly, a district court in Gilliard v. Carson" 7 held Younger
inapplicable to a civil rights class action challenging assignment-
of-counsel practices in the Municipal Court of Jacksonville,
Florida. The plaintiffs alleged that the local court was not prop-
erly applying Argersinger v. Hamlin, 1 8 which held that in the
absence of a knowing and intelligent waiver no person can be
imprisoned unless represented by counsel. After reviewing the
Jacksonville procedures governing assignment of counsel, the
court concluded that the plaintiffs' rights as announced in Arger-
singer and in Tate v. Short" 9 were being violated, and granted
116 Id. at 1091 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). See also Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. 67 (1972); Pugh v. Rainwater, 483 F.2d 778 (5th Cir. 1973), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part sub nom. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), Supreme Court decision discussed in
text accompanying notes 128-34 infra; Joiner v. City of Dallas, 380 F. Supp. 754 (N.D.
Tex.) (three-judge court), aff'd, 419 U.S. 1042 (1974). In the context of state civil pro-
ceedings, the Supreme Court in Fuentes v. Shevin held that Younger did not bar declara-
tory and injunctive relief against continued enforcement of Florida and Pennsylvania
statutes that allowed a private party to obtain a prejudgment writ of replevin by submit-
ting an ex parte application and posting a double bond. In holding that the statutes
deprived the plaintiffs of their property without due process of law, the Court brushed
aside the vigorous contention of the dissenting Justices that the Younger doctrine re-
quired dismissal. The majority held Younger inapplicable because "[n]either Mrs.
Fuentes nor the [other] appellants . . . sought an injunction against any pending or
future court proceedings as such .... Rather, they challenged only the summary extra-
judicial process of prejudgment seizure of property to which they had already been
subjected." 407 U.S. at 71 n.3. The Supreme Court might have distinguished Younger
on the ground that a civil, rather than criminal, proceeding was involved. Its failure to
do so presaged its later decision in Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975). In
Huffman, the Court extended the Younger rule to civil actions that are quasi-criminal in
nature.
117 348 F. Supp. 757 (M.D. Fla. 1972).
I's 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
119 401 U.S. 395 (1971). Tate held that "the Constitution prohibits [a] State from
imposing a fine as a sentence and then automatically converting it into a jail term solely
because the defendant is indigent and cannot forthwith pay the fine in full." Id. at 398
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detailed injunctive relief.120 The court distinguished Younger on
the ground that "[tjhe plaintiffs in the present case do not ask
that enforcement of any ordinance of the City of Jacksonville or
any law of the State of Florida be enjoined or that any ordinance
or law be invalidated. They do not ask that any conduct be made
unpunishable.
' 121
In Utz v. Cullinane,122 the District of Columbia Circuit held
that considerations of comity did not bar an injunction against
the routine transmittal of arrest records to the Federal Bureau
of Investigation by local police:
Since this is not an action for expungement (the merits
of which depend on the peculiar facts of the specific
case), but an action to enjoin the practice of routinely
disseminating arrest records (the merits of which de-
pend on general principles of constitutional law which
apply in all preconviction situations and on construction
of a local ordinance), there was no reason for the Dis-
trict Court to abstain in favor of action by the presiding
judge of any local criminal prosecution.
1 23
Other federal courts faced with similar factual situations
have refused to grant relief against unconstitutional state crimi-
nal pretrial practices and procedures. For example, in Kinney v.
Lenon,124 the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a class ac-
tion that was brought to overturn an Oregon statute that denied
juveniles the right to be released from detention on bail. The
(quoting Morris v. Schoonfield, 399 U.S. 508, 509 (1970)). See also Williams v. Illinois,
399 U.S. 235 (1970).
120 348 F. Supp. at 762-63.
121 Id. at 762. A case quite similar to Gilliard v. Carson arose in Pennsylvania when
indigents facing prosecution in Allegheny County were denied the assistance of counsel
at preliminary hearings in violation of the Supreme Court decision in Coleman v.
Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970). Conley v. Dauer, 463 F.2d 63 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1049 (1972). The district court granted declaratory relief, but, in order to allow
the state courts time to comply with Coleman, refused to grant an injunction. 321 F.
Supp. 723 (W.D. Pa. 1970). Noting that "[iut is now more than 20 months since Coleman
and County authorities have yet to comply with its mandate," the Third Circuit re-
manded the case to the district court for action to ensure compliance. 463 F.2d at 66.
The Court of Appeals skirted the Younger issue, stating only that the lower court's deci-
sion "may have called for a different result on appeal had appellees taken a cross ap-
peal from that declaratory judgment." Id. at 66 n.14. Had it wished to do so, however,
the circuit court clearly could have raised the Younger objection on its own motion and
reversed the lower court's decision.
122 520 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
123 Id. at 473 n.9.
124 447 F.2d 596 (9th Cir. 1971).
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court found the reasoning used to distinguish Younger in Conover
v. Montemuro and Gilliard v. Carson unpersuasive:
Although the injunction sought would not have termi-
nated the entire proceeding, the interference would
have been substantial. The juvenile court's jurisdiction
attaches at the point the child is taken into custody....
The detention hearing at which the determination is
made on whether to release the child pending a hearing
on the merits is characterized by appellants themselves
as a "critical stage" in the juvenile proceeding. There
are elaborate statutory provisions concerning the deten-
tion question, designed to properly address the delicate
problem of dealing with juvenile offenders. . . . Any
interference at this stage would clearly be at odds with
the principles of comity and federalism which underlie
Younger.'
25
Similarly, in Harrington v. Arceneaux ,126 a Louisiana district court
dismissed a civil rights action challenging a statute that denied
bail in capital cases. The court rejected the complainant's argu-
ment that because he did not request that the court enjoin his
state prosecution, Younger was inapplicable:
Though Douglas v. City of Jeannette and Younger
v. Harris . . . direct attention to the policy against en-
joining state proceedings, this court is of the opinion
that the principles of comity and federalism stated
therein are controlling in this case, even though grant-
ing of the relief prayed for would not affect the state
proceedings. The district court, in the absence of com-
pelling circumstances, should not enjoin the legitimate
activities of a state in the administration of its own crim-
inal laws.1
27
125 Id. at 601. The Ninth Circuit later reaffirmed its stance in Kinney in a case
involving a similar challenge to California's juvenile detention statutes. The court re-
jected "the interesting argument that [Younger] does not apply because the substance of
the attack here was not to stay state court proceedings, but to attack a 'procedural
incident related to such prosecutions.'" Rivera v. Freeman, 469 F.2d 1159, 1164 (9th
Cir. 1972).
126 367 F. Supp. 1268 (W.D. La. 1973).
12 71d. at 1272. See also Leslie v. Matzkin, 450 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
406 U.S. 932 (1972). In Matzkin, indigent plaintiffs alleged that Connecticut violated
their constitutional rights by refusing to supply them with free copies of their prelimi-
nary hearing minutes, which would assist their trial preparation. The plaintiffs sought
an order directing the defendant state officials to supply free transcripts. Even though
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The Supreme Court appeared to resolve this conflict among
the circuits in Gerstein v. Pugh,128 siding with the courts that had
held that Younger did not bar federal relief. In Gerstein, detainees
awaiting state criminal proceedings brought a civil rights class
action to obtain declaratory and injunctive relief against the state
practice of detaining persons prior to trial without a judicial
determination of probable cause, solely on the basis of a
prosecutor's information. The district court granted the desired
relief and ordered the defendants "to submit a plan providing
preliminary hearings in all cases instituted by information."'12 9
Subsequently, a final order was issued by the district court that
"prescribed a detailed post-arrest procedure."'130
The Supreme Court disagreed with the lower court on the
merits, and reversed in part and remanded for further proceed-
ings. Specifically, the Court agreed that the Constitution does
require a judicial determination of probable cause, but held that
the adversary safeguards necessary at a "critical stage" of the
prosecution were not required for the probable cause determina-
tion because of the nature of the fourth amendment probable
cause standard. 3' The Court stated, however, that the lower
court possessed the power to enter its order:
The District Court correctly held that respondents'
claim for relief was not barred by the equitable restric-
tions on federal intervention in state prosecutions,
Younger v. Harris ... . The injunction was not directed
at the state prosecutions as such, but only at the legality
of pretrial detention without a judicial hearing, an issue
the plaintiffs did not seek to enjoin their prosecutions, the Second Circuit held that the
"case clearly calls for deference to the state's procedures for the vindication of constitu-
tional claims" and refused to grant relief. Id. at 312. Although Matzkin was decided
incorrectly on this issue, see discussion of Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), in text
accompanying notes 128-34 infra, the Matzkin result appears to be correct on the merits,
because the record showed that counsel representing indigent defendants could pass
the cost of transcripts on to the state as part of the expense incurred in representing
their clients. 450 F.2d at 311.
128 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
1
29 Id. at 108.
130 Id. Under the district court's plan, upon arrest, an accused would be taken be-
fore a magistrate for a "first appearance hearing." The magistrate would be reqtiired to
explain the charge, to advise the accused of his rights, to appoint counsel, and to pro-
ceed with a probable cause determination unless either side was unprepared. If more
time were requested, the magistrate would set a date for a preliminary hearing within
four days if the accused is in custody, and within ten days if he has been released. The
accused would be entitled to the full panoply of procedural safeguards at the hearing.
The plan provided sanctions for failure to hold the hearing within the prescribed time.
1
31 Id. at 119-26.
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that could not be raised in defense of the criminal pros-
ecution. The order to hold preliminary hearings could
not prejudice the conduct of the trial on the merits. See
Conover v. Montemuro . . . ; cf. Perez v. Ledesma . . .
Stefanelli v. Minard .... 132
In so holding, the Court apparently determined that
Younger does not close the federal courts to litigants seeking
relief from unconstitutional state practices merely because the
requested relief affects the way in which state criminal proceed-
ings are conducted. Rather, the federal courts may act to modi-
fy constitutionally deficient state criminal practices and proce-
dures (1) if the claims pressed in the federal action cannot be
raised in defense of the state criminal charges, and (2) if the
relief requested is not directed at the prosecution as such and
cannot prejudice the conduct of the trial on the merits. 133 The
13 2 Id. at 108 n.9 (citations omitted). It is difficult to determine what significance, if
any, should be accorded the fact that the Court's entire treatment of the Younger issue is
contained in one footnote. Perhaps the Court thought the result to be so obvious that it
was not worth textual elaboration. On the other hand, the Court may have treated the
issue in a footnote to avoid the implication that it was making a major statement con-
cerning the scope of the Younger doctrine. See also Gold v. Connecticut, 531 F.2d 91 (2d
Cir. 1976). In Gold, a criminal defendant challenged a "gag order" that the trial judge
had imposed on his attorneys. Citing footnote nine of Gerstein, the court declared that
"federal review may be available where such orders affect First Amendment rights not
capable of vindication through direct appeal from conviction." Id. at 92. The court held
that intervention was inappropriate in this case, however, because the appellant had
failed to demonstrate the absence of state court remedies for his complaint.
133 Kinney v. Lenon, 447 F.2d 596 (9th Cir. 1971), discussed in text accompanying
notes 124-25 supra, and Rivera v. Freeman, 469 F.2d 1159 (9th Cir. 1972), discussed in
note 125 supra, exhibited the same characteristics that lifted Gerstein out of the Younger
realm. The plaintiffs in Kinney and Rivera did not attack their prosecutions; rather, they
challenged the constitutionality of laws denying bail to juveniles, an issue that could not
be raised in defense of the charges against them. Furthermore, had the federal court
ordered modification of the pretrial release standards, this relief could not have prej-
udiced the conduct of the plaintiffs' trials. Thus, these cases were decided wrongly
according to the rationale enunciated later in Gerstein.
Wallace v. Kern (III), 520 F.2d 400 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1109
(1976), discussed in text accompanying notes 9-16 supra, also exhibited all of the charac-
teristics that removed Gerstein from the reach of the Younger doctrine, and it thus ap-
pears to have been decided wrongly. In Wallace v. Kern (III), the Second Circuit refused
to order the federal relief necessary to correct constitutional deficiencies in state bail
practices. The court attempted to distinguish Gerstein on the ground that "the federal
plaintiffs there had no right to institute state habeas corpus proceedings except perhaps
in exceptional circumstances." 520 F.2d at 406. Reliance on this distinction was mis-
placed, however, because Younger was not properly applicable to Gerstein and Wallace v.
Kern (III) in the first instance, and the plaintiffs thus should not have been required to
demonstrate that they came within one of the exceptions to the Younger rule. See text
accompanying notes 144-72 infra. Regarding the adequacy of state remedies for vin-
dicating the constitutional rights of plaintiffs who raise claims similar to those raised in
Wallace v. Kern (III), see text accompanying notes 157-72 infra.
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Court thus implied that the application of the Younger doctrine
to constitutional challenges of state pretrial practices and proce-
dures is limited primarily to situations, such as in Younger itself,
in which the complainant asserts a claim that could be raised in
defense of the state charges and asks the federal court to enjoin
the pending state prosecution.
34
One final class of cases in which the Younger doctrine ordi-
narily should not apply is that in which the complainants seek
only prospective relief. As was noted above, 135 the doctrine limit-
ing federal intervention in state criminal proceedings evolved in
large part in the context of threatened prosecutions, the Su-
preme Court in Younger and subsequent cases held that the doc-
trine has no force when a prosecution is merely threatened. This
raises the interesting possibility that plaintiffs in a civil rights
class action challenging the constitutionality of state criminal
practices and procedures might avoid the application of the
Younger doctrine by requesting only prospective relief. Such a
course presupposes, however, that some members of the class,
and perhaps the named plaintiffs themselves, will be found suf-
ficiently likely to be arrested in the future so that the standing
problems that arose in O'Shea v. Littleton'3" and Gardner v.
Luckey137 could be avoided. Moreover, in assessing whether such
relief is permissible, a court should consider the extent to which
ordering reform of procedures in future prosecutions might in-
terfere with presently pending cases.138
A Virginia district court wrestled with these questions in
Rakes v. Coleman,' 39 an action brought on behalf of all persons
"convicted or being convicted"' 40 under a public drunkenness
"I Lower federal courts also have ordered reform of state pretrial criminal prac-
tices an procedures when necessary to ensure constitutional conditions of confinement
in state pretrial detention facilities. For example, the First Circuit required Boston offi-
cials to continue funding the Bail Appeal Project at the Suffolk County Jail to ensure
that a court-ordered program of single-cell occupancy was not endangered. Inmates of
Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 518 F.2d 1241 (1st Cir. 1975). Similarly, a Texas
district court ordered extensive reform in local bail, calendar, and hearing practices to
alleviate the inhumane overcrowding of inmates in Harris County detention facilities.
Alberti v. Sheriff of Harris County, 406 F. Supp. 649 (S.D. Tex. 1975). Younger and its
progeny were not mentioned in either decision.
13' See text accompanying notes 71-80 supra.
136 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
137 500 F.2d 712 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 841 (1976); see note 100 &
text accompanying notes 96-100 supra.
138 See note 90 supra.
139 359 F. Supp. 370 (E.D. Va. 1973).
140 Id. at 372.
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statute. The plaintiffs claimed that the eighth amendment re-
quires the courts to recognize the disease of alcoholism as a
defense to such prosecutions. The court held that it was barred
by Younger and its companion cases from interfering with any
pending prosecutions, but it inferred from the phrase "being
convicted" that the plaintiffs intended to challenge future
prosecutions as well. Rakes and other members of the plaintiff
class were found to have standing to challenge future prosecu-
tions because "[their] continuing odyssey from jail to jail on
drunk charges satisfie[d] the Court that, upon release [they
would] again be charged with drunkenness, denied the defense
of alcoholism and incarcerated without rehabilitation."'141 Al-
though the court failed to consider the extent to which granting
prospective relief might have affected pending prosecutions, 142
the court's conclusion that Younger does not necessarily bar re-
quests for prospective relief is sound.
In summary, a federal court should not grant coercive relief
directed against a state prosecution as such except under the
extraordinary circumstances discussed below.' 43 It should not
issue an order that will have the effect, either directly or indi-
rectly, of bringing the plaintiff's state criminal proceedings to a
halt. A federal court may, however, grant relief either directed
against nonjudicial officials or related to matters ancillary to the
criminal proceedings that cannot be raised in defense against the
criminal prosecution.
The scope of the federal relief provided should be limited as
well. Blanket injunctions issued in lieu of individual determina-
tions usually will be inappropriate. Relief that necessitates fed-
eral review of decisions of state court judges on substantive is-
sues or interferes directly with such decisions also should not be
granted. Moreover, a federal court should not engage in ongo-
ing monitoring and supervision of such decisions. A federal
14
1 Id. at 373.
142 The court was without the benefit of the Supreme Court decisions in Steffel v.
Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974), discussed in text accompanying notes 77-80 supra, and
Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975), discussed in text accompanying notes
79-80 supra; thus, it assumed that the standards enunciated in Fenner v. Boykin, 271
U.S. 240 (1926), discussed in text accompanying notes 35-39 supra, which involved only a
threatened prosecution, applied to the case at hand. The court found, however, that
the threat of irreparable injury from future incarceration was sufficiently great to merit
federal intervention if the plaintiffs could prevail on the merits. 359 F. Supp. at 378-79.
See also Maynard v. Wooley, 406 F. Supp. 1381 (D.N.H. 1976) (three-judge court), prob.
juris. noted, 44 U.S.L.W. 3738 (U.S. June 21, 1976) (No. 75-1453).
143 See text accompanying notes 144-72 infra.
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court may, however, grant and enforce simple, workable relief
that directs a state to afford, or declares that a state should
afford, certain procedural safeguards for accused persons.
Moreover, in some cases in which Younger might otherwise be
held applicable, a court may avoid dismissing the action by grant-
ing prospective relief only and in that way avoiding interference
with pending prosecutions.
B. Defining Exceptions to the Younger Rule
In discussing standards for federal intervention in state
criminal matters, this Article has thus far attempted to deter-
mine when Younger should apply in the first instance to particu-
lar cases brought before the federal courts. Merely because a
particular case comes within the scope of the Younger doctrine,
however, the federal court is not necessarily barred from hear-
ing the case; if that case falls within one of the exceptions to the
Younger rule, the federal court may reach the substantive issues
of the complaint.
Younger, itself, provides little specific guidance for determin-
ing when the nonintervention doctrine should not be invoked,
despite its facial applicability to a particular case. The Court in
Younger concentrated on identifying circumstances that are not
sufficiently "special" to justify federal intervention. The Court
did state, however, that to merit relief a complainant must be
threatened with both great and immediate irreparable injury'44
and have no adequate remedy at law.
145
1. Irreparable Injury
The Court in Younger stated that the mere "cost, anxiety,
and inconvenience of having to defend against a single criminal
prosecution"'146 does not constitute an irreparable injury.
Moreover, a prospective injury is not irreparable if it can be
eliminated through defense of a single criminal prosecution.
47
144 401 U.S. at 45-47.
1
45 Id. at 43-44.
14 6 Id. at 46.
147 Id. The Court also included in its definition of the "special circumstances" that
merit federal intervention cases such as Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965), in
which the plaintiffs were subjected to harassment and bad faith prosecutions brought
merely to discourage the exercise of constitutionally protected rights without any real
hope of obtaining convictions. 401 U.S. at 47-50. See generally text accompanying notes
55-60 supra. But see Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117 (1975). The practices and proce-
dures under discussion in this Article rarely involve the malicious and intentional de-
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Many criminal defendants are incarcerated on the basis of
constitutionally defective pretrial practices, 148 however, and the
courts agree generally that any unconstitutional deprivation of
liberty, regardless of length, involves irreparable injury. For ex-
ample, when an indigent complainant was threatened with im-
minent incarceration because he was unable to comply with a
Georgia statute making monetary restitution to the victim of a
crime committed by the convicted perpetrator a condition of
probation, the Fifth Circuit declared the statute unconstitutional
and enjoined its enforcement. The Court stated that to "await
actual incarceration would not merely be draconian; it would
involve irreparable injury to the probationer."'149 Similarly, in
Gilliard v. Carson, 50 the court ordered modification of uncon-
stitutional assignment-of-counsel practices in a Florida municipal
court because indigents facing prosecution were in "imminent
danger" of having "their clearly established constitutional rights
violated and suffer[ing] irreparable harm by being unlawfully
deprived of their personal liberty."'151
privation of rights by state officials that occurred in Dombrowski. Therefore, this excep-
tion to the Younger rule will not be discussed further.
148 See, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975); Wallace v. Kern (III), 520 F.2d
400 (2d Cir. 1975), cert denied, 424 U.S. 912 (1976); Conover v. Montemuro, 477 F.2d
1073 (3d Cir. 1973); Gilliard v. Carson, 348 F. Supp. 757 (M.D. Fla. 1972). See generally
NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS & GOALS, REPORT ON
COURTS 77-82 (1973); PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS (1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE
REPORT].
149 Morgan v. Wofford, 472 F.2d 822, 826 (5th Cir. 1973). The Fifth Circuit has
also noted that "even temporary unconstitutional deprivations of liberty" may constitute
"great and immediate irreparable injury." Pugh v. Rainwater, 483 F.2d 778, 782-83 (5th
Cir. 1973), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975),
discussed in text accompanying notes 128-34 supra.
150 348 F. Supp. 757 (M.D. Fla. 1972), discussed in text accompanying notes 117-21
supra & 167-68 infra.
151 Id. at 761-62. See also Rakes v. Coleman, 359 F. Supp. 370, 378 (E.D. Va. 1973).
Several other federal courts, including the Supreme Court, have implied strongly that
an imminent danger of unlawful incarceration constitutes a sufficient threat of great
and immediate irreparable injury to warrant federal intervention. In Schlesinger v.
Councilman, 420 U.S. 738 (1975), a serviceman facing court-martial for the alleged sale
and possession of marijuana sought an injunction against the proceedings on the
ground that the offenses charged were not "service connected" and thus were not
within court-martial jurisdiction. In support of his complaint, the plaintiff claimed that
"he would incur 'great and irreparable damage in that he [might] be deprived of his
liberty without due process of law ... ' Id. at 754. The Supreme Court was plainly
skeptical of the plaintiff's allegations, and found that his chances of incarceration were
slim. The plaintiff was not incarcerated pending trial, and it was doubtful that, if con-
victed, plaintiff would be incarcerated pending review within the military system.
Furthermore, according to the Court, "there was no reason to believe that his possible
conviction inevitably would be affirmed," even if one supposed that his "service-
connection contention almost certainly would be rejected on any eventual military re-
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The threat of irreparable injury also exists when complain-
ants must risk multiple prosecutions. When the Younger Court
held that to be considered irreparable, an injury had to consist of
something more than the burden of defending against a single
prosecution, it implied that being forced to defend against
multiple prosecutions might involve irreparable injury. Sub-
sequently, a number of lower federal courts so held. In Interna-
tional Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Conlisk,152 for ex-
ample, the court enjoined the prosecutions of members of a
religious sect for alleged violations of Chicago ordinances gov-
erning peddling, begging, and public exhibitions. Federal inter-
vention was held to be appropriate in part because "given the
multiplicity of actions, individuals and charges involved in the
pending state court actions, [the plaintiffs] are burdened with
significantly more than the mere 'cost, anxiety, and inconve-
nience of having to defend against a single criminal prosecu-
tion. ... . "153 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit in Krahm v. Graham
1 54
found that the repeated, groundless prosecutions of bookstore
owners and clerks in Phoenix, Arizona for the sale of allegedly
obscene books and magazines was causing irreparable injury:
Surely the damage from this sort of activity is both
irreparable and "great and immediate." It can put the
plaintiffs out of business without ever convicting any of
them of anything. Nor can the threat to plaintiffs' first
amendment rights be eliminated by defense against the
state prosecutions. Successful defense against eleven of
them.., brought the filing of fourteen more .... 155
Many actions challenging criminal practices and procedures
are brought as class actions. Arguably, because the class as a
whole is being subjected to multiple prosecutions, the aggregate
injury is sufficiently g'eat to be considered irreparable. The
view ...." Id. Thus, the Court concluded that he was threatened with no injury other
than that incidental to every criminal proceeding brought lawfully and in good faith.
The implication of the Court's decision was that if the plaintiff had demonstrated a
credible threat of incarceration, the injury involved would have been sufficiently great
to merit federal intervention. See also Lynch v. Snepp, 472 F.2d 769, 776 (4th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983 (1974); Horodner v. Cahn, 360 F. Supp. 602, 605 n.6
(E.D.N.Y. 1973).
152 374 F. Supp. 1010 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
'
5 3 Id. at 1014.
154 461 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1972).
155 Id. at 707. See also International News Distribs., Inc. v. Shriver, 488 F.2d 1350
(6th Cir. 1973).
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Supreme Court, in Roe v. Wade,'56 left open the question
whether a class action might be treated differently for Younger
purposes than a case brought by a single plaintiff. To date,
neither the Supreme Court nor any other federal court has an-
swered this question.
2. Inadequate Remedy at Law
The Supreme Court has stated that a complainant has an
adequate state remedy at law if he is given "the opportunity to
raise and have timely decided by a competent state tribunal the
federal issues involved."' 57 The federal courts have generally
been willing to find that a plaintiff lacks an adequate remedy at
law either when no procedural mechanism exists within the state
system by which he might raise the claim pressed in federal
court, or when a state remedy "exists in theory, but in practice
[is] cumbersome and inefficacious.'
158
Morgan v. Wofford' 59 provides an example of the former
situation. In Morgan, at the time the plainfiff brought his federal
action, no state procedure existed by which he could raise his
constitutional challenges to the Georgia statute mandating that
he pay restitution as a condition of probation. The Fifth Circuit
held that "[a]bstention under the doctrine of Younger v. Harris
... was never intended where there is no possible state proceed-
ing through which appellant may raise his constitutional ob-
jections to a state proceeding which has already occurred."'
16
Similarly, in Callahan v. Sanders,'1 6 1 in issuing an injunction pro-
hibiting justices of the peace from hearing traffic cases when
15r 410 U.S. 113, 127 n.7 (1973).
157 Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 577 (1973). In Younger, the Court held that
the pending state criminal proceedings themselves provided an adequate remedy at law
because the plaintiff could raise his constitutional challenges to the relevant statute as a
defense in those proceedings. 401 U.S. at 49. See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 126
(1973); United States ex rel. Husdon v. Wollenzien, 345 F. Supp. 436, 438 (E.D. Wis.
1972). In Leslie v. Matzkin, 450 F.2d 310, 312 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 932
(1972), discussed in note 127 supra, the Second Circuit held that the plaintiffs had an
adequate remedy at law because, if necessary, they could raise on appeal from their
convictions their constitutional objections to the state court's refusal to provide them
with free preliminary hearing minutes.
Traditionally, to be considered adequate, a legal remedy had to be "as complete,
practical and efficient as that which equity could afford." Terrace v. Thompson, 263
U.S. 197, 214 (1923). See also Potwora v. Dillon, 386 F.2d 74, 77 (2d Cir. 1967).
158 G.I. Distribs., Inc. v. Murphy, 336 F. Supp. 1036, 1039 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other
grounds, 469 F.2d 752 (2d Cir. 1972), vacated, 413 U.S. 913 (1973).
159 472 F.2d 822 (5th Cir. 1973), discussed in text accompanying note 149 supra.
160 Id. at 826 (citation omitted).
161 339 F. Supp. 814 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
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they had a pecuniary interest in convicting alleged violators, the
district court noted that "[t]here is no provision for review of
the legality of the proceedings before the Justice of the Peace
upon appeal .... "162
The federal courts also have found theoretically available
remedies to be inadequate in practice in cases in which the state
tribunal was biased against the plaintiffs, the state courts had
definitively rejected the substance of the plaintiffs' claims in pre-
vious cases, or state review could not come quickly enough to
avoid irreparable injury. In Gibson v. Berryhill,'16  the Supreme
Court held that "the predicate for a Younger v. Harris dismissal
was lacking," because the district court had found that the
Alabama State Board of Optometry "was incompetent by reason
of bias to adjudicate the issues pending before it."'1 4 In Cleaver v.
Wilcox,165 which involved a suit challenging the constitutionality
of the California practice of conducting child dependency pro-
ceedings without assigning counsel to indigent parents, the
Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs' claim would "not receive an
effective hearing and vindication in a state proceeding" because
"[lt]he California courts have repeatedly denied or refused to
hear these claims in the past."'166 Finally, in Gilliard v. Carson,1
6 7
1621 Id. at 818 (quoting Hulett v. Julian, 250 F. Supp. 208, 209 (M.D. Ala. 1966)
(three-judge court)). In Sanders, the court probably assumed that there was little point
in challenging the conduct of the justices of the peace before the justices themselves. See
also Tucker v. Board of Comm'rs, 410 F. Supp. 494 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (three-judge
court).
163 411 U.S. 564 (1973).
264 Id. at 577.
165 499 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1974).
166Id. at 943-44. Similarly, in G.I. Distribs., Inc. v. Murphy, 336 F. Supp. 1036
(S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 469 F.2d 752 (2d Cir. 1972), vacated, 413 U.S. 913
(1973), and in Vali Books, Inc. v. Murphy, 343 F. Supp. 841 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), the court
ordered injunctive relief after finding that it would be futile for the plaintiffs to seek in
state court the return of a large quantity of allegedly obscene matter seized during a
police raid. The court based this finding on a New York Court of Appeals ruling that a
prior adversary hearing is not a prerequisite for a search warrant in the usual motion
picture case. In Detco, Inc. v. Breier, 349 F. Supp. 537 (E.D. Wis. 1972), a Wisconsin
district court held that plaintiffs who were seeking to enjoin enforcement of Wisconsin's
obscenity statute had no adequate remedy at law in light of recent Wisconsin Supreme
Court decisions construing that statute in a way violative of the first amendment. See
also Bruno v. Warren, 344 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Wis. 1972). Finally, in Anderson v.
Nemetz, 474 F.2d 814, 820 n.2 (9th Cir. 1973), the court held that a plaintiff who was
seeking an injunction against the prospective enforcement of an Arizona vagrancy law
should not be denied relief when he had raised his constitutional objections in state
courts on four previous occasions without success. But see Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S.
332, 350 n.18 (1975); Anonymous v. Association of the Bar, 515 F.2d 427, 434-35 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 863 (1975).
167 348 F. Supp. 757 (M.D. Fla. 1972), discussed in text accompanying notes 117-21,
150 supra.
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in granting injunctive relief modifying assignment-of-counsel
practices in the Jacksonville municipal court, the district court
held that the alternative of each indigent citizen's petitioning for
a writ of habeas corpus after being confined unlawfully was
"manifestly inadequate," because that remedy would not be
available "until after irreparable damage has been sustained and
may, because of the time necessarily involved in such proceed-
ings, prove unavailable at all."168
These cases suggest that once a federal court determines
that the Younger doctrine applies, it must take a realistic look at
whether theoretically available remedies are truly adequate in
fact. Other practical considerations support this position. For
example, judges in state criminal courts often "face long calen-
dars with the certain knowledge that their calendars tomorrow
and the next day will be, if anything, longer."1 69 As a result, the
courts are preoccupied usually with rapid consideration and dis-
position of individual cases, and it is often difficult, if not impos-
sible, for them to consider broad constitutional challenges to
their practices and procedures. 70 Similar considerations often
reduce the effectiveness of individual appeals and state habeas
corpus proceedings' 7' in providing relief from unconstitutional
state practices and procedures. 72 Although the considerations of
' 68 Id. at 762; see Newton v. Burgin, 363 F. Supp. 782 (W.D.N.C. 1973) (three-
judge court), aff'd, 414 U.S. 1139 (1974). In Burgin, the court overturned a North
Carolina statute allowing state officials to seize and hold a child for up to five days
without a hearing if the child appeared to be in danger. The court held that depriva-
tion of custody of the child for five days was an irreparable injury to the child's family
for which there was no adequate legal remedy, because the injury would occur regard-
less of the outcome of the eventual hearing. Id. at 785.
'69 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 128 (1967).
170 See id. 128-29; TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 148, at 31-34.
171 Individual state habeas corpus petitions, commonly suggested as an adequate
state remedy, see e.g., Wallace v. Kern (III), 520 F.2d 400, 407 (2d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 912 (1976), are often inadequate to correct injuries caused to victims of
assembly-line justice. The type of relief available through a state habeas corpus petition
is limited to the release of the person illegally detained; thus the state court judge
cannot issue an injunction ordering systemic changes in criminal practices and proce-
dures. See, e.g., People ex rel. Gonzalez v. Warden, 21 N.Y.2d 18, 233 N.E.2d 265, 286
N.Y.S.2d 240 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 973 (1968). Moreover, the adequacy of state
habeas corpus may be vitiated by the fact that it tests the legality of detention, and thus
is not available until after irreparable injury caused by deprivation of liberty already has
occurred.
172 For example, a voluntary guilty plea results in a waiver of all prior nonjurisdic-
tional defects "not logically inconsistent with the valid establishment of factual guilt."
Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 63 n.2 (1975); see United States ex rel. Glenn v.
McMann, 349 F.2d 1018 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 915 (1966). See also
Wallace v. Heinze, 351 F.2d 39 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 954 (1966). Except
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comity, federalism, and equity militate against federal relief in
every case, the federal courts must look beyond the remedies
theoretically available to the complainant and examine whether
the realities of the particular case ensure adequate state relief.
In summary, a federal court should not grant relief that
would effectively halt a pending state criminal proceeding unless
the plaintiff would suffer irreparable injury if relief were de-
nied. Although the cost, anxiety, and inconvenience incidental to
defending against a single criminal proceeding do not by them-
selves constitute irreparable injury, the injury becomes irrepara-
ble if the plaintiff has to defend against multiple prosecutions, or
if a class of plaintiffs is subjected to unconstitutional state crimi-
nal practices. Moreover, unlawful incarceration constitutes ir-
reparable harm per se.
Regardless of what injury might occur in the absence of any
remedy, however, a federal court should not enjoin or effectively
halt a pending state criminal proceeding when the plaintiff has
an adequate remedy at law. A remedy at law is adequate when
the complainant can obtain a timely and complete resolution of
his federal claims before a state tribunal, either in defense of the
pending criminal proceeding, or in some other way. A plaintiff
lacks an adequate remedy at law, however, when no procedural
mechanism exists within the state system by which the complain-
ant may raise his federal claims, or when a remedy that exists in
theory is inadequate in fact to protect the plaintiff's constitu-
tional rights.
IV. CONCLUSION
The foregoing represents an attempt to chart a workable
middle course for the federal courts in civil rights actions chal-
lenging the constitutionality of state criminal practices and pro-
cedures. Such lawsuits raise particularly acute problems in fed-
eral-state relations. Adoption of the suggested standards should
enable the federal courts to play an important role in vindicating
the constitutional rights of criminal defendants without engag-
ing in overly broad interference with state proceedings.
for challenges to the validity of the plea itself, this rule eliminates most challenges to
pretrial practices and procedures on appeal.
